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LAND USE: HEREIN OF VESTED RIGHTS, PLANS, AND
THE RELATIONSHIP OF PLANNING AND CONTROLS
David L. Callies*
There can be little argument about the jurisdictional importance of Ha-
waii land use law. Land use management and control is almost synony-
mous with Hawaii.' But Hawaii is not yet a particularly litigious state in
the field of land use controls, and what litigation there is that has made
its way into the federal and state appellate courts of record here has been
relatively sparse. Most of its well-known state and local land use control
regulations" are only recently or not yet challenged. While it is possible to
extrapolate theories and principles from sparse existing case law and ap-
ply them in those many areas in which Hawaii has so far no appellate
courts cases, this is neither the province nor the purpose of a survey,
which should be confined to reporting and interpreting what is. This sur-
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I See F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QuiEr REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONRoL (1971)
[hereinafter cited as THE QuiEr REVOLUTION]; F. Boss.LmAN, D. FEuRwE & C. SEMON, UR-
BAN LAW INsTITUTE, THE PERMIT EXPLOSION: COORDINATION OF THE PROLIFERATION (1976); D.
MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION (1976) [hereinafter cited as
MANDELKER]; P. MYERS, ZONING HAWAII: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PASSAGE AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF HAWAII'S LAND CLASSIFICATION LAW (1975) [hereinafter cited as ZONING HAWAII].
' See THE QuiET REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at ch. 1; MANDELKEE, supra note 1; ZOmNG
HAWAII, supra note 1; Mandelker & Kolis, Whither Hawaii: Land Use Management in an
Island State, 1 U. HAWAII L. REv. 48 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Whither Hawaii]. Most of
these comment upon controls such as the Hawaii State Land Use Law, HAWAII REV. STAT.
ch. 205 (1976 & Supp. 1979). There is little yet written upon controls such as Honolulu's
charter provisions requiring all new land use changes to accord with local development
plans. Charter of the City & County of Honolulu § 5-412(3). Development plans are pres-
ently in draft form.
3 It is only in late 1978 that an intermediate appellate court was authorized by constitu-
tional amendment, see HAWAII CONsT. art. VI, § 2, and but a few months ago that judges for
that court were confirmed by the state senate, see letter from Seichi Hirai to Hon. George
R. Ariyoshi (Fed. 27, 1980). This survey is based only upon appellate - and, therefore, until
the recently authorized system is functioning - Hawaii Supreme Court decisions.
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vey therefore concentrates on a number of recent cases4 which will criti-
cally influence certain specific areas of land use management and control
in Hawaii: vested rights, the relationship of planning to zoning, the char-
acter of state zoning amendments, and water rights and coastal zone
ownership.
I. VESTED RIGHTS
The point at which a developer is entitled to proceed with a develop-
ment in the face of a newly enacted land use regulation which, if applied
to the development, would hinder or prevent it is becoming a commonly
litigated issue across the country. 5 While it is fair to say that most juris-
dictions are satisfied with an expenditure of funds in reliance upon a pre-
existing zone classification to support a claim for these so-called vested
rights,6 some jurisdictions have disregarded altogether fairly large
amounts so expended.7 The law therefore appears to vary significantly
with the jurisdiction.
There is a fair amount of recent case law in Hawaii on this critical sub-
ject.6 The Hawaii Supreme Court has dealt with it directly on five occa-
sions in the past ten years,9 most recently in January of 1980.0 The trend
appeared to be in the direction of the strict California rule until quite
I Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 48 U.S.L.W. 4045 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1979) (No. 78-738);
Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978); Life of the Land, Inc. v.
City Council, No. 7240 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. Jan. 4, 1980); Life of the Land, Inc. v. Land Use
Comm'n, 61 Hawaii -, 594 P.2d 1079 (1979); Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council, 60
Hawaii 446, 592 P.2d 26 (1979); Kailua Community Council v. City & County of Honolulu,
60 Hawaii 428, 591 P.2d 602 (1979); Allen v. City & County of Honolulu, 58 Hawaii 432, 571
P.2d 328 (1977); Akahane v. Fasi, 58 Hawaii 74, 565 P.2d 552 (1977); Save Hawaii Loa Ridge
Ass'n v. Land Use Comm'n, 57 Hawaii 84, 549 P.2d 737 (1976); Hall v. City & County of
Honolulu, 56 Hawaii 121, 530 P.2d 737 (1975); Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 55 Hawaii 538,
524 P.2d 84 (1974); Denning v. County of Maui, 52 Hawaii 653, 485 P.2d 1048 (1971); Dalton
v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969).
5 2 N. WuIL~iAMs, AMERIcAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 56.02 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WuL-
LIAMS]; 4 id. § 104.02; see Hagman, The Taking Issue: The HFH et al. Round, 28 LAND USE
L. & ZONING DIG. No. I, at 5 (1976); McCown-Hawkes & King, Vested Rights to Develop
Land: California's Avco Decision and Legislative Responses, 6 ECOLOGY L. Q. 755 (1978).
6 See 4 WILLIAMs, supra note 5, at § 111.02.
E.g. Avco Community Developers v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 533
P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); HFH, Ltd. v. Supe-
rior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
* See Devens, Overview Remarks, in VESTED RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 9 (Proceed-
ings of June 22, 1979 Conference on Planning for Growth Management, Honolulu, Hawaii).
' Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council, No. 7240 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1980); Life of
the Land, Inc. v. City Council, 60 Hawaii 446, 592 P.2d 26 (1979); Allen v. City & County of
Honolulu, 58 Hawaii 432, 571 P.2d 328 (1977); Denning v. County of Maui, 52 Hawaii 653,
485 P.2d 1048 (1971); Dalton v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 400, 462 P.2d 199
(1969).
'0 Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council, No. 7240 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1980).
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recently. Much will depend on the extent to which future decisions either
hearken back to the first true vested rights decision in Hawaii" or pro-
ceed down a "softer" path trod by the majority, over a strong dissent, in a
later pronouncement by the court."9
The two most recent - and critical - cases dealing with vested rights
and equitable estoppel in Hawaii bear the same name, Life of the Land,
Inc. v. City Council.'5 The litigation dealt respectively with attempts to
preliminarily and permanently enjoin the construction of a multi-story
condominium building. Because the majority and dissenting opinions in
the first case divided on the extent of vested rights, and the court argua-
bly departed from previous Hawaii cases on vested rights in the second
case, the rulings place Hawaii at a crossroads in this area in many re-
spects. In the first decision, both majority and dissent claimed Denning v.
County of Maui" as their touchstone. Since Denning was the first case to
deal directly with the subject in Hawaii and was the basis for both Life of
the Land cases and the intervening case of Allen v. City & County of
Honolulu, 5 we turn first to an analysis of Denning.
The facts of Denning are relatively straightforward. Denning purchased
property near Kihei on Maui which was at the time (1968) classified in
both the county master plan and the county zoning ordinance as "hotel
district". Applicable regulations in the zoning ordinance limited buildings
constructed in the hotel district to a height of twelve stories and a "floor
area/lot area ratio" (FAR)"6 of 150% .17 One year after purchasing the
property, Denning sought from the county planning director informal
"preliminary approval" of plans for an eight-story condominium project
with an FAR of 144.1%. While agreeing that the proposed development
accorded with existing zoning, the director also noted in his written reply
that the county was then considering a proposed general plan which des-
ignated Denning's land "resort commercial". Zoning regulations applica-
ble to the designation would reduce the maximum permitted height from
twelve to six stories. The court in its factual summary interpreted these
letters as "clearly" implying that the zoning regulations would control de-
velopment although it is unclear whether by this the court meant that
planning without implementing zoning was inapplicable or that Denning
should then have been on notice that new regulations would likely apply
Denning v. County of Maui, 52 Hawaii 653, 485 P.2d 1048 (1971).
, Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council, 60 Hawaii 446, 451, 592 P.2d 26, 29 (1979)
(Kidwell, J., dissenting).
,s No. 7240 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1980); 60 Hawaii 446, 592 P.2d 26 (1979).
1 52 Hawaii 653, 485 P.2d 1048 (1971).
58 Hawaii 432, 571 P.2d 328 (1977).
10 Floor/area ratio (FAR), as the court noted, is determined by dividing the square foot
area of a lot into the square footage of floor space to be developed. Thus, if one knows the
lot area and the required FAR, one can readily determine the amount of floor space permis-
sible by multiplying the lot area by the FAR in the zoning ordinance.
11 52 Hawaii at 654, 485 P.2d at 1049.
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soon. Nevertheless, the director stated in two separate communications
that it would be "difficult to determine" what regulations would apply to
Denning's land.'
A couple of months later, an interim ordinance reducing the height on
Denning's land was indeed enacted, and Denning accordingly modified
his plans and reduced the height of his condominium project to six sto-
ries. The following month the director once again gave preliminary ap-
proval to Denning's plans much in the same form as before. Denning
made minor changes as required by the director over the next three
months and continued to receive assurances that his plans conformed to
the existing ordinances. Then the county council enacted an ordinance
further reducing the height in the area, including Denning's land, to two
stories and the FAR to 100%. The director told Denning that the new
ordinance would apply to his land and, more importantly, to his contem-
plated condominium project. 9 (The court noted that the ordinance was
"silent as to whether it affects development in progress to the extent of
Denning's project.' '20 )
Informed that a building permit for his proposed project would be de-
nied, Denning unsuccessfully sought permission to continue the develop-
ment from the Maui County Board of Adjustment and Appeals, alleging
that he had incurred approximately $38,000 in architectual, advertising,
and legal fees. There was nothing to indicate any physical work had be-
gun on the site itself. The board refused to act, and Denning appealed to
the circuit court which remanded back to the board for a hearing and
decision.2
1
The Hawaii Supreme Court first dealt summarily with that remand.
Noting that after the ordinance change (reducing the height to two stories
and the FAR to 100%) the board "was bound to enforce the terms" of
that ordinance, the court held that the board was without jurisdiction to
permit Denning to proceed under the old ordinance, and since no vari-
ance"1 had been sought it was without jurisdiction altogether. Therefore,
the circuit court's remand was reversible error.2 Nevertheless, the court
set out what it considered to be the critical test for deciding vested rights
cases, even though it was not called upon to do so by the posture of the
case:
" Id. at 655, 485 P.2d at 1049.
1 Id. at 657, 485 P.2d at 1050.
20 Id.
Id.
" A variance is an exception from applicable land use regulations granted in cases of
hardship uniquely caused to the applicant for relief. A variance is usually granted to provide
relief to the landowner who has been unduly burdened. There are basically two types of
variances: bulk variances and use variances. See Garner & Callies, Planning Law in En-
gland and Wales and in the United States, 1 ANGLO-AMEmCAN L.J. 292, 309 (1972) [herein-
after cited as Garner & Callies].
23 52 Hawaii at 658-59, 485 P.2d at 1051.
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[F]or Denning to be allowed the right to proceed in constructing the planned
structure the facts must show that Denning had been given assurances of some
form by appellants that Denning's proposed construction met zoning require-
ments. And that Denning had a right to rely on such assurances thereby equi-
tably estopping appellants from enforcing the terms of [the ordinance]."
Citing a California case,' 8 the court continued: "Mere good faith expec-
tancy that a permit will issue does not create in a property owner a right
to continue proposed construction."' 6 This differed from the trial court's
rule.' 7 The key appears to be the matter of "right." What is the quality of
the assurance? Is it merely an "expectancy" that a permit will issue? The
court held that the passage of the first of the ordinances (reducing the
height from twelve to six stories) could very well be critical. The court's
reference to the purpose of the first ordinance as protecting the'proposed
general plan while zoning regulations were being formulated"2 and its ref-
erence to an article"o discussing with approbation interim zoning mea-
sures 0 suggest that the court considered the first ordinance to be in the
nature of an interim zoning regulation. Since Denning clearly had notice
of the first ordinance according to the facts, he presumably would not be
able to claim any vesting of rights (or damages?) between the notice and
the eventual refusal to issue a building permit on the strength of the sec-
ond ordinance further restricting his right to develop.
Six years later, the court again considered vested rights and develop-
ment rights in Allen v. City & County of Honolulu.1 It is here that the
court made a distinction between vested rights and equitable estoppel.
The court had before it one of three cases decided by the lower court in
which money damages had been awarded to compensate developers for
expenditures alleged to have been made in reliance upon then existing
zoning regulations of the city and county. Allen had purchased a parcel
Id. (footnotes omitted).
" Russian Hill Impr. Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d 34, 423 P.2d 824, 828,
56 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676 (1967).
52 Hawaii at 659, 485 P.2d at 1051 (footnote omitted).
'7 The trial court had ruled: "If Denning expended substantial sums for the preparation
of plans and documents in good faith reliance upon law prior to Ordinance No. 641 and
which expenditures were incurred upon the reasonable probability of a building permit be-
ing issued then Denning must be allowed the right to proceed." Id. at 658, 485 P.2d at 1051.
8 Id. at 659, 485 P.2d at 1051: "The function of this measure [the first ordinance] was
undoubtedly to protect the design of the proposed General Plan 701 while the zoning regu-
lations pertaining thereto were still in their incubative stage."
2, Id. at n.8 (citing Note, Stopgap Measures To Preserve the Status Quo Pending Com-
prehensive Zoning or Urban Redevelopment Legislation, 14 W. RRs. L. REv. 135 (1962)).
3o Interim zoning is a temporary measure used to prevent development in an area that
has not been zoned or an area that is undergoing a comprehensive study for rezoning. In-
terim measures can be useful in assuring orderly development but also can be misused by a
government to delay zoning or rezoning an area. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND
LAND DzWORzoPzNT CoNToL LAW 84 (1971).
3, 58 Hawaii 432, 571 P.2d 328 (1977).
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classified A-3 under the zoning code for the purpose of constructing an
eleven-story condominium. The current zoning permitted buildings up to
350 feet high. There was evidence that Allen purchased the property only
after inquiring about existing zoning and consulting an architect. Imme-
diately following purchase, Allen retained the same architect and "com-
menced architectual, engineering and other work necessary to obtain a
building permit from the city. '8 2 Six months later a rezoning amendment
which had the effect of downzoning Allen's property was passed by the
city council. Meanwhile, Allen had testified against the proposal at a pub-
lic hearing two months before passage and four months after purchase of
the property and had applied for a building permit which had been par-
tially approved on the date the rezoning ordinance was passed. Allen did
not wait for a denial, however, and promptly withdrew his building per-
mit application.8
Allen thereafter sued the city for $77,000 in damages - allegedly the
amount of nonrecoverable costs incurred up to the date the downzoning
ordinance was passed. The trial court found there had been a substantial
change in position resulting in some $68,000 of nonrecoverable costs14 and
found the city liable for that amount.31
But the supreme court held that Allen could not recover monetary
damages from the city, whether or not he had a valid vested rights claim:
In our opinion, to permit damages for development costs is not only unprec-
edented but would also be unsound policy. Were we to affirm the award of
damages, the City would be unable to act, if each time it sought to rezone an
area of land it feared judicially forced compensation. Monetary awards in zon-
ing disputes would inhibit governmental experimentation in land use controls
and have a detrimental effect on the community's control of the allocation of
its resources3 6
Further, the court held that if found to be equitably estopped from
enforcing its ordinance, then the city should decide whether to condemn
I d. at 433, 571 P.2d at 328.
Id. at 434, 571 P.2d at 329.
U Id.:
Prior to the effective date of Ordinance 4145, the Plaintiffs in reliance on the A-3 zoning
then in effect and on the reasonable probability that a building permit would be issued,
substantially changed their position and incurred certain nonrecoverable costs for the
development of their property in the amount of $67,950.26 for which they were and are
liable.
Id. at 434-35, 571 P.2d at 329:
(1) Plaintiffs had the right to rely on the zoning requirements existing prior to the
effective date of Ordinance 4145. (2) The City is liable for the costs incurred by the
Plaintiffs in reliance on the then existing A-3 zoning and on the reasonable probability of
the issuance of a building permit. (3) The mere introduction of Bill 46 on March 6, 1973
does not constitute notice to the Plaintiffs that the zoning would be changed.
Id. at 438, 571 P.2d at 331.
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the property rights or repeal its zoning restrictions:
Prohibiting damages for development costs does not mean that a property
owner must suffer an injury without compensation, for if the facts establish
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply to prevent the City from
enforcing newly enacted prohibitive zoning, then the property owner is entitled
to continue construction. Once the City is estopped from enforcing the new
zoning, if it still feels the development must be halted, it must look to its pow-
ers of eminent domain. In order for the City to operate with any sense of
financial responsibility the choice between continued construction and paying
to have it stopped by condemnation, if possible, must rest with the City-not
property owners. 3
But it is the Hawaii Supreme Court's dicta, not its holding in Allen,
which is important for predicting its future direction in vested rights
cases. Citing with apparent approval recent cases from California3 8 and
Illinois,8 9 a unanimous court seemed to favor applying an increasingly
strict standard to property owners claiming vested rights or equitable es-
toppel as against a change in land use regulations applicable to their
property. The court began by quoting with approval a distinction be-
tween vested rights and estoppel, "O noting that courts reached the same
results under either theory."1 The court then noted the tough standards
applied in California and Illinois and reiterated its language in Denning
that "mere good faith expectancy" would not be enough.42 So far, the
court appears to be saying that Allen had no more than such an
expectancy.
But it is on this point that the court concentrated on the issue of dam-
ages, noting that in two other cases decided the same day by the trial
court'" building permits had issued and construction had begun.4" In each
" Id. at 439, 571 P.2d at 331.
a Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785,
553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
11 First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Rockford, 47 Ill. App. 3d 131, 361 N.E.2d 832
(1977).
"0 58 Hawaii at 435, 572 P.2d at 329 (quoting Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of
the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. L.
ANN. 63, 64-65):
The defense of estoppel is derived from equity, but the defense of vested rights reflects
principles of common and constitutional law. Similarly, their elements are different. Es-
toppel focuses upon whether it would be inequitable to allow the government to repudi-
ate its prior conduct; vested rights upon whether the owner acquired real property rights
which cannot be taken away by governmental regulation. Neiertheless, the courts seem
to reach the same results when applying these defenses to identical factual situations.
(Footnotes omitted.)
41 58 Hawaii at 435, 571 P.2d at 329.
" Id. at 436, 571 P.2d at 330.
" Hale Kona Kai Dev. Corp. v. Yuasa, Civ. No. 39391; Guerin v. Yuasa, Civ. No. 39390
(1st Cir. Ct. Hawaii July 24, 1973) (decided together).
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of these declarative and injunctive relief had been sought, the trial court
had held that the permits had been rightfully revoked, and damages had
been awarded.'
5
In sum, it would appear from Allen (and especially in light of Denning)
that the Hawaii Supreme Court was moving, if not directly toward strict
standards making a showing of vested rights or equitable estoppel diffi-
cult in cases of downzoning, at least toward a theory of compensable reg-
ulations in which the law would stand but some measure of compensation
might be due the landowner stopped in medias res. Nevertheless, Allen
left many questions unanswered, not the least of which was: Is a devel-
oper who has expended sums in reliance on existing zoning, but who has
not commenced construction, likely to be able to show any vested rights
or claim equitable estoppel?
The first Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council's case would seem to
answer, yes. In this recent decision, a bare majority of the court held that
where a developer, in good faith reliance upon existing law, has expended
substantial sums for the preparation of plans and documents for the pur-
pose of applying for a building permit, and it is further shown that he has
been given assurance in some form by county officials charged with ad-
ministering the law that his proposed construction meets zoning require-
ments, and that he had a right to rely on such assurances, the county will
be equitably estopped from denying him a building permit by reason of a
subsequently enacted prohibitory ordinance. The critical questions be-
come: (1) What reliance is "good faith"; (2) what sums are "substantial";
(3) what constitutes "assurance" by officials; and (4) when does a devel-
oper have a right to rely on such assurances? While some answers are
discernible from the majority opinion, they must be carefully considered
not only in light of the strong dissents by two of the five justices sitting,
but also in light of the retirement of one justice each from the majority
and dissenting blocks. 47 Appointments to the State's highest court could
change considerably the future lineup on these critical questions. Moreo-
ver, the case is tinged by the intense political and public controversy over
construction of the Admiral Thomas condominium project overlooking
one of Honolulu's treasured urban parks.48 Finally, a unanimous supreme
court (with two temporary justices assigned by reason of the aforemen-
tioned vacancies) has rejected Life of the Land's request for a permanent
injunction. 49
The salient facts are relatively uncomplicated and undisputed .5  The
" 58 Hawaii at 437, 571 P.2d at 330.
41 Id., 571 P.2d at 330-31. Neither decision was appealed.
46 60 Hawaii 446, 592 P.2d 26 (1979).
'7 Justice Kobayashi who voted with the majority has recently retired, as has Justice
Kidwell.
" The Admiral Thomas condominium overlooks Thomas Square Park.
49 Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council, No. 7240 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1980).
" Id., slip op. at 1.
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developers' property is located in a district which, at the time of applica-
tion to build, was controlled by a building permit moratorium. The mora-
torium had been in effect for eighteen months when the developers ap-
plied to the city council for an exemption, which it may grant in its
discretion under the terms of the moratorium ordinance. 1 Two months
later, the council approved such an exemption for a 350-foot, 177-unit,
35-story condominium. Had it not been for the moratorium, the proposed
building would have been a permitted use in the A-4, high density apart-
ment zone. " '
Approximately one month later, the city reduced the height limit to
299 feet and the number of units to 150 and added, among other condi-
tions,65 a 95-foot setback from Victoria Street.5 4 The developers agreed.
Two months later, plans embodying these changes appear to have been
submitted." But the following month, the Thomas Square Historic, Cul-
tural and Scenic (HCS) District Ordinance became effective.56 That ordi-
nance prohibited a structure such as that proposed by the developer.
Three months later, Life of the Land sued the city and the developer, and
late in 1978 the trial court decided in favor of the defendants. It was only
after that decision that the council "determined" that all conditions had
been met by the developer, leaving the city's department of land utiliza-
tion free to issue a building permit.5 7
The Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to grant a
temporary injunction. In so doing it reaffirmed its language in Denninge
and Allen" that a developer who spends money in good faith reliance on
existing law may have a right to proceed - the local government being
equitably estopped from enforcing an ordinance which does not permit
such development. But the majority further expanded the scope of vested
rights which, although defensible, purports to be derived from the two
earlier cases. It is not altogether clear that a basis for such expansion can
be found in or fairly implied from either prior case.
First, the court clearly extended equitable estoppel rights to expendi-
tures for plans and documents - in this case an amount apparently ex-
" 60 Hawaii at 448, 592 P.2d at 27.
82 Id., 592 P.2d at 28.
" The developers were mandated to enter negotiations with the Honolulu Academy of
Arts for underground parking, to consider any urban design policy that might emerge for
the Thomas Square area in designing the project, and to study the possibility of construct-
ing two residential buildings rather than one. Id. at 455 n.4, 592 P.2d at 31 n.4 (Kidwell, J.,
dissenting).
" Id. at 454-55, 592 P.2d at 31 (Kidwell, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 449, 592 P.2d at 28. Whether plans in conformance with these changes were in
fact submitted is not clear. Justice Kidwell, at least, regarded this as a factual issue to be
considered later. Id. at 459, 465, 592 P.2d at 33, 37.
Id. at 449, 592 P.2d at 28.
67 Id.
" See text accompanying note 24 supra.
" See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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ceeding half a million dollars.60 Although the previous cases did in fact
deal with such expenditures, there is at least a suggestion in Allen that
neither the amount nor kind of spending would lead to the application of
equitable estoppel.6 1 Indeed, the court in Allen expressly held it was not
deciding whether the city should be estopped from enforcing the ordi-
nance in question, but only whether the damage remedy was proper.
0 2
Whether it is appropriate in Hawaii to extend equitable estoppel to
money spent in planning and design prior to the issuance of a building
permit, the point is that it is not nearly so clear the court had already
done so in Allen and Denning, yet the court apparently thought it did so
then. In any event, it does so now."
Second, and more troublesome, the court assumed without discussion
that the developers had acquired development rights by virtue of their
acquisition of the property zoned A-4 prior to the passage of the morato-
rium." While there may be jurisdictions that so hold, more discussion
and explanation seems preferable if this is the direction Hawaii means to
go. Following Allen the Hawaii legal community justifiably could have
" 60 Hawaii at 450, 592 P.2d at 29. It is not terribly clear, of all the amounts discussed by
the court, which it considered applicable to the issue in this case:
In this case, the expenditures made by the developers were substantial. In reliance
upon Section IV of Ordinance No. 4551, they proceeded to file an application for an
exemption from the moratorium on July 11, 1977. The record is not clear exactly how
much was spent by the developers in the preparation of plans and designs in support of
their application, but it does show that up to September 21, 1977, when the city council
gave its express approval to the proposed construction, they had already incurred ex-
penditures in excess of $150,000 for planning and design. They first acquired develop-
ment rights to the property on August 22, 1975, before the passage of Ordinance No.
4551. Following council approval, and between September 21, 1977 and November 10,
1977, they incurred expenditures of close to $95,000 for the project, of which the sum of
approximately $85,000 was allocated for planning and design. Subsequent city council
action on November 10, 1977, necessitated further construction design modifications. Be-
tween that date and April 20, 1978, the developers incurred expenditures of approxi-
mately $321,000, of which some $275,000 went for planning and design. By the time the
suit was filed on May 2, 1978, in an attempt to put a halt to the project, they had in-
curred further expenditures of approximately $7,500 for planning and design. These ex-
penditures for planning and design were incurred by reason of, and in compliance with,
council action on their application, and in reliance upon the implicit assurance that if
the special construction conditions imposed by the council were met, a building permit
would issue.
Id. at 450-51, 592 P.2d at 29.
61 Here, the trial court ruled that appellees had a right to rely on the A-3 zoning and that
the city was liable for appellees' nonrecoverable preparatory expenses. On review of the
record it is difficult to ascertain the basis of that ruling.
62 58 Hawaii at 436, 571 P.2d at 330.
*' Justice Kidwell is not so sure. In his dissent he notes the alternate grounds presented
by corporation counsel for the city for approving the project. 60 Hawaii at 456-57, 592 P.2d
at 32. However, it is clear from the brief majority opinion that the court is speaking in
estoppel terms, citing Denning and Allen with approval.
"They first acquired development rights to the property on August 22, 1975 ... " 60
Hawaii at 450, 592 P.2d at 29.
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counselled quite the opposite considering the court's apparent reliance on
the Avcol' case from California, a jurisdiction to which Hawaii often looks
for guidance on issues of first impression.
One of the dissenting justices" set out additional problems with the
decision in what is virtually a parallax opinion to that of the majority.
Three issues were raised in that dissent: (1) Good faith reliance and no-
tice, (2) good faith reliance and certainty, and (3) legislative intent.
The first is one of good faith reliance and notice. By virtue of the very
fact that the interim moratorium ordinance was just that - interim and
moratorium - any property owner to whom it applied must have been
put on notice that changes were in the wind. Indeed, the whole purpose of
such an ordinance is to freeze development until such time as a new
scheme is in place, expressly to prevent developers from becoming
grandfathered into the existing system while the government perforce
works its public way to change the rules. 7 Moreover, it appears that for
some time the developers here knew precisely what was being planned for
the property - an ordinance that would virtually prohibit their develop-
ment." Under these circumstances, it is not easy to characterize the de-
veloper here as having relied in good faith and without notice.
There is a more difficult issue as well. Good faith reliance requires a
relatively certain set of development possibilities. Here there was hardly
any such certainty. While it may well be that the developers had more
than what the dissent characterized as "ambiguous promises that the pro-
05 Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785,
553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977) (rejecting devel-
oper's claim to vested right in construction of project even though developer before passage
of the permit legislation had spent more than $2 million in constructing storm drains, cul-
verts, utilities, and similar improvements, had incurred several thousand dollars in liability,
and was losing nearly $10 thousand per day; rejecting claim of estoppel based on agreement
between developer and government agency on ground that government cannot contract
away its police powers, including land use regulations).
66 Justice Kidwell, since retired, wrote the dissenting opinion.
0" See Silvers v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 3 Cal. App. 3d 554, 83 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1970);
Hagman, A "Back Door Run" Around Limitations on Granting Zoning Variances, 22 LAND
UsE L. & ZONING DIG. 146 (1970).
68 60 Hawaii at 456, 592 P.2d at 32 (Kidwell, J., dissenting):
From some date prior to September 2, 1977, the Developers were aware that a draft of
an ordinance creating a "historic, cultural and scenic district" which would include the
Admiral Thomas parcel was under consideration by a committee of the Council and that
the draft ordinance contemplated height restrictions which were inconsistent with the
Developers' plans. The Developers had, prior to September 21, 1977, presented argu-
ments directly to a member of the Council in an attempt to defeat the ordinance. A
public hearing on the proposed ordinance was scheduled to be held on January 25, 1978.
On January 24, 1978 the Developers filed an application for a building permit. The pro-
posed ordinance became effective as the HCS Ordinance by its passage by the Council
and its approval by the mayor on February 22, 1978. The HCS Ordinance by its terms
prohibits construction on the Admiral Thomas parcel of any structure in excess of a
height limit computed by a formula. It is not disputed that the building proposed to be
constructed by the Developers would exceed that height limit.
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posed construction would be permitted in the legislative discretion of the
Council, ' 69 nevertheless it is fair to characterize their reliance, especially
after passage of the interim moratorium, as something less than the rela-
tive certainty provided by an existing and unencumbered zoning classifi-
cation. The dissenting opinion set out the lack of assurance which the
developers had here, contrasting it with the Denning decision:
It is necessary at the outset to recognize a critical difference in the posture of
the Developers from that of the landowner in Denning. There the existing or-
dinance left nothing to be determined by the county authorities except compli-
ance of the proposed development with a set of criteria spelled out in the ordi-
nance. In the present case, on the other hand, the governing ordinance forbade
the proposed development, subject only to modification of the application of
the ordinance in the legislative discretion of the Council. The Developers could
receive assurances that their proposed construction was not prohibited by the
IDC Ordinance only by way of action by the Council. Moreover, the IDC Ordi-
nance contained an express limitation on the power, as distinct from the dis-
cretion, of the Council, that any such modification must be consistent with
proposed amendments to existing land use regulations and with "the health,
safety, morals and general welfare."
The Developers must find the assurances they need to satisfy the Denning
test in the action of the Council on September 21, 1977 and November 10,
1977. These actions were far from unqualified and unambiguous ...
It is not possible to read the resolution of November 10, 1977, as the Devel-
opers seemingly would have us do, as merely an expression of hope on the part
of the Council with no sanction available to the Council to enforce its direc-
tives. In my opinion, the action of the Council can reasonably be interpreted
only as conditioning its approval upon the satisfactory compliance by the De-
velopers with those directives. Not only did these directives require the Devel-
opers to engage in a course of negotiation with other parties which would be
subject to subsequent evaluation by the Council, but also the Developers were
required to consider changes in the design of the project as necessary to con-
form to the standards of the HCS Ordinance when enacted. It is clearly im-
plied that the Council was to review the Developers' consideration of these
standards and that the Council would have to be satisfied that its directive had
been observed before the building permit would issue. Such confirming action
on the part of the Council did not take place until October 28, 1978.
These facts do not support equitable estoppel under the Denning test. On
the date of enactment of the HCS Ordinance the Developers had, instead of
assurances that the proposed construction met zoning requirements, only am-
biguous promises that the proposed construction would be permitted in the
legislative discretion of the Council if the efforts of the Developers subsequent
to November 10, 1977 to comply with the Council's directives were determined
to meet some unexpressed standard of sufficiency."
If the Council's actions were more than "ambiguous promises" - and I
e Id. at 464, 592 P.2d at 37. (Kidwell, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 463-65, 592 P.2d at 36-37 (Kidwell, J., dissenting).
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submit that they were - they were also something less than a certainty
upon which to build a case of equitable estoppel.
Finally, the dissent raised an interesting question of legislative intent:
Did the passage of the HCS District Ordinance contain any exception for
the Admiral Thomas project, and if not, could the court supply one? The
answer is plainly, no. Rules of statutory construction permit no reading in
of unexpressed intent; the council, with a clear opportunity to express its
intent in the ordinance, passed a measure that was unambiguous and ex-
pressly effective upon enactment." But it is worth examining the conse-
quences of this particular answer: no vested rights or equitable estoppel
will apply to any project upon which construction has not yet begun, re-
gardless of the good-faith reliance of the developer or the amount ex-
pended in such reliance. This is a bit far reaching and would put Hawaii
at or near the forefront among jurisdictions (like California) in which the
absence of a building permit virtually forecloses either vested rights or
equitable estoppel regardless of the other circumstances.7 2
The most recent (January 1980) supreme court decision on these facts"
did not really resolve many of these issues, holding as it did that the city
never intended that the HCS District Ordinance restricting heights in the
Thomas Square area should apply to the developers here. 4 Thus, the
court avoided the vested rights issue almost entirely by construing the
facts in such a way as to make the passage of the aforesaid ordinance,
" Id. at 460, 592 P.2d at 34 (Kidwell, J., dissenting):
Rules of statutory construction do not permit a court to read into legislation which
changes zoning standards an unexpressed intent to leave proposed construction unaf-
fected. The HCS Ordinance is unambiguous. It expressly was effective on enactment,
with no exception for the Admiral Thomas project. There was no occasion for the Coun-
cil to express its intent more clearly in order for the ordinance to be effective in accor-
dance with its terms.
72 Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commn, 17 Cal. 3d 785,
553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); HFH, Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975); Hagman, The Tak-
ing Issue: The HFH et al. Round, 28 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. No. II, at 5 (1976); see
Kanner, Public Right to Compensation for Public Land Use Control, in VESTED RIGHTS
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 43 (Proceedings of June 22, 1979 Conference on Planning for Growth
Management, Honolulu, Hawaii); Kanner, The Consequences of Taking Property by Regu-
lation, 24 PRAc. LAW. 65 (1978).
In fairness, it is worth observing that there is no mention of equitable estoppel in the
quotation from Justice Kidwell in note 71 supra, and it is therefore arguably separable from
the equitable estoppel issue and the way I have chosen to phrase it.
73 Life of the Land, Inc., v. City Council, No. 7240 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 1980). The
court discusses a host of technical and procedural issues raised by plaintiff-appellant Life of
the Land which, while of some importance to the outcome of this particular appeal, are
beyond the scope of the survey article which focuses on the major issue of vested rights. It is
worth noting that the court seems more concerned with compliance with the spirit of the
plethora of procedural requirements for land use changes in Honolulu than with their strict
letter. See, e.g., id., slip op. at 48 (no need to formally state "self-evident" undue hardship);
id. at 52 (no need for formal "justification" report).
71 Id. at 66.
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otherwise restricting the developers' rights, inapplicable to the now virtu-
ally completed condominium building."
To do so, the court exhaustively set out the facts, especially the se-
quence of events leading to the approval of the HCS District Ordinance
by the city council.7" Pointing in particular to language from various
members of the council in the course of hearings on the ordinance and
the "compromise" by which the Thomas Square developers agreed to re-
duce building height and density," the court held:
It is clear from (a) the discussion at the Committee of the Whole meeting of
November 10, 1977; (b) the discussion at the public hearing held on the pro-
posed HCS District No. 5 Ordinance on January 25, 1978; and (c) the HCS
District No. 5 Ordinance as finally enacted, that the City Council did not in-
tend that the ordinance should operate to deny to the Developers the building
permit for the Admiral Thomas project, to which they would have been enti-
tled, pursuant to the November 10, 1977, approval of their application for vari-
ance or modification under the Kakaako Ordinance.
Those provisions in the Revised Kakaako Ordinance affirmed and expressed
the clearly ascertainable intent of the City Council that the Admiral Thomas
project be exempted from the operation of the HCS District No. 5 Ordinance."
Then, the court emphasized the absence of anything in the record or
legislative history indicating the HDC ordinance was meant to apply ret-
roactively. Since the court decided that the developer had received ap-
proval before HDC's passage, the ordinance would have to be retroactive
in order even to raise a vested rights question: "There is no provision in
the quoted section, or in any other section of the ordinance, which makes
it operate retrospectively. Consequently, it operates only prospectively. ' 7
Finally, the court proceeded to deal briefly with the question of equita-
ble estoppel. After citing Denning0 and Allen,8 1 the court set out its defi-
nition of the applicable rule (which, by virtue of its earlier joining of the
two concepts, applies in Hawaii to vested rights as well):
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on a change of position on the
part of a land developer by substantial expenditure of money in connection
with his project in reliance, not solely on existing zoning laws or on good faith
expectancy that his development will be permitted, but on official assurance on
which he has a right to rely that his project has met zoning requirements, that
necessary approvals will be forthcoming in due course, 'and he may safely pro-
75 Id.
" Id. at 2-36, 60-70.
77 Id. at 61-62, 65-68.
"S Id. at 66, 70.
79 Id. at 69.
" Id. at 73 (citing Denning v. County of Maui, 52 Hawaii 653, 485 P.2d 1048 (1971)).
" Id. (citing Allen v. City & County of Honolulu, 58 Hawaii 432, 571 P.2d 328 (1977)).
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ceed with the project.2
More questionable is the court's assertion that the official assurances
which developers received at various times in 1977 were "official assur-
ances on which the Developers had a right to rely to proceed with their
projects,"8 in light of similar fact situations in Denning. Recall that
Denning also was in compliance with then existing zoning ordinance pro-
visions. Recall that Denning also was aware of pending legislation that
would make his project unbuildable but that he was advised by appropri-
ate officials that he was then in compliance. He also spent sums in reli-
ance on that assurance.8 4 While it is true that Denning spent far less in
reliance upon these assurances (by several hundred thousand dollars) and
Denning had not sought a formal "variance" from existing zoning restric-
tions as did the developers in Life of the Land, nevertheless the theoreti-
cal distinction is weak. The court in Denning held that Denning failed to
demonstrate he had been given assurances (upon which he had a right to
rely) that his project met existing zoning requirements.88 Yet, he appears
to have received about as much assurance as the developers in Life of the
Land. If Denning could not proceed, then why should not the Victoria
Partnership have been similarly precluded if the Hawaii Supreme Court
continues, as it says it does, to rely on Denning for precedent in the area
of estoppel and vested rights?
Of course, it is again worth noting that vested rights - equitable estop-
pel - was only one of several issues discussed by the court and raised by
plaintiff-appellants. 86 Moreover, based upon earlier conclusions with re-
spect to the intent of council and the prospective nature of the HDC ordi-
nance, such rights may have been irrelevant to the outcome of this case.
The importance of the decision lies in its continued cloud over the issue
of vested rights - equitable estoppel as applied to land use decisions in
Hawaii.87
82 Id.
83 Id.
See discussion of Denning in text accompanying notes 16-30 supra.
88 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
No. 7240, slip op. at 30 (validity of council action; effective dates of approval of devel-
opers' application and the HCS Ordinance).
8, A final note. The supreme court discussed the issue of variance in connection with the
existing ordinance scheme pertaining to the land upon which the condominium structure
was proposed to be built. The court discussed the nature of interim ordinances and found
them not to be zoning ordinances at all, and therefore the council's activities with respect to
developers' request for a variance therefrom not to be subject to the customary require-
ments and procedures usually required for such land use changes:
That provision did not apply to the Developers' application because the Developers'
application was not a petition for varying the application of a zoning ordinance with
respect to a particular parcel of land, but was an application for variance or modification
under the Kakaako Ordinance, which was not a zoning ordinance.
Id. at 47.
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF PLANNING TO ZONING
"The best-laid schemes o' mice an' men gang aft a-gley."
Robert Burns
While it may very well be that the best of plans are all for naught in
practice, there is no question that plans, at least land use plans, were
always supposed to precede land use controls as exemplified by zoning.'8
That they did not for decades after the judicials and legislative 0 actions
which led to the rapid spread of zoning is well nigh indisputable.9 ' Re-
cently, however, many jurisdictions have thought better of it,9" and, at
least at the state level,93 zoning is once more to be in accordance with a
It will be interesting to see how this language is interpreted by the courts in subsequent
decisions. There is a tendency in Hawaii for variance requirements to be more or less loosely
observed. The court's language here will do nothing to circumscribe that tendency. It is also
not true that all interim land use ordinances are not zoning ordinances, despite the court's
interpretation and citing of eminent authority to the contrary, 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING § 11.01 (1979), cited in id. at 42. Many interim land use ordinances
are zoning ordinances, and are entitled to the same procedural and substantive treatment
upon application for modification as any so-called standard zoning ordinance.
It is worth noting that two radically different bills were introduced in the current Hawaii
legislative session, each purporting to resolve the vested rights issue. See H.B. 2671-80, H.D.
1; S.B. 3097-80, S.D. 1, 10th Hawaii Leg., 2d Sess. (1980). The house bill died; the surviving
senate bill (as of March 1980) restates the common law in several jurisdictions.
88 See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); THE QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 1; Gar-
ner & Callies, supra note 22; Haar, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan", 68 HARV.
L. REV. 1154 (1955).
" Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
so STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1928); STANDARD
STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce rev. ed. 1926).
"8 See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); THE QuIET REVOLUTION, supra note 1; Gar-
ner & Callies, supra note 22.
92 E.g., California, Florida, and Oregon. See Mandelker, The Role of the Local Compre-
hensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 899, 931-44 (1976).
" How it will fare at the federal level, which has recently reentered the zoning game after
five decades of silence, is another matter. Despite an impaspioned plea from an amicus brief
filed on behalf of the National Association of Homebuilders, the American Institute of Plan-
ners, and the American Society of Planning Officials (the last two since merged into the
American Planning Association) the United States Supreme Court in City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976), did much to destroy the efficacy of planning as
a necessary prelude to land use controls. See Callies, The Supreme Court is Wrong About
Zoning by Popular Vote, 42 PLANNING 17 (1976). But see DuBose, The Supreme Court Is
Right About Zoning By Popular Vote, 42 PLANNING 4 (1976). Its pale rehabilitation in its
unfortunate decision in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (effectively setting back antidiscrimination by zoning a decade or so, contrary to the
hopes and wishes of many commentators - see, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusion-
ary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969)), is too little,
too late.
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comprehensive plan."' Some states have gone so far as to require that no
future local land use regulation shall be enacted or amended unless it is
in accordance with a comprehensive plan,95 causing some courts to invali-
date those zoning ordinances and amendments passed after the date of
such legislation if the zoning is not clearly in accordance with the ap-
proved comprehensive plan." So it appears to be with Hawaii.
A. The Importance of a Plan
The benchmark for such an interpretation is Dalton v. City & County
of Honolulu.9 7 The case is significant primarily for its interpretation of
that part of the Charter for the City and County of Honolulu 8 which
requires zoning to follow the direction of a comprehensive plan. Less clear
is what procedural and substantive planning and research steps must pre-
cede a change in the general plan in light of 1973 revisions to the charter
made specifically in response to Dalton. The case also set out some points
concerning standing" and laches 1°0 in land use decisionmaking which are
not pertinent here.
In Dalton the city and county amended the Comprehensive Zoning
Code [CZC] to permit increased density on Castle Estate land. The
amending ordinances were passed after the council first amended the gen-
eral plan detailed land use map and general plan text so that the permis-
sible use of the Castle Estate land changed from residential and agricul-
" See generally Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan", 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154 (1955).
"4 See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1978-1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. 163.3194 (West Supp. 1979).
See also Charter of the City and County of Honolulu art. V, § 5-412(3).
Dalton v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969); Baker v.
City of Milwaukie, 271 Or. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1974); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs,
264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); 1000 Friends of Ore. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 32 Or.
App. 413, 575 P.2d 651 (1978). See Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan
in Land Use Regulation, 74 MCH. L. REV. 899, 956-65 (1976).
" 51 Hawaii 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969). See the discussion of Dalton in Chatburn, Compre-
hensive Planning: Only as Certain as Your Survival, VIII HAWAII B.J. 15 (1971).
" Honolulu is a home rule municipality. It is therefore more independent of the State in
many functional areas than it would be as simply a creature of the State, as an incorporated
governmental unit whose powers are solely what the State chooses to grant. See HAWAII
CONST. art. VIII.
" 51 Hawaii at 402-03, 462 P.2d at 202. For a discussion of a more recent decision focus-
ing on the standing issue, see text accompanying notes 191-204 infra.
'oo Id. at 403-08, 462 P.2d at 202-05 (remanding the issue to trial court). "Laches" is an
equitable doctrine in which the plaintiff is estopped from enforcing his rights because, due
to his delay in invoking those rights, the position of the other party has so changed that he
cannot be restored to his former condition. Wisdom's Adm'r v. Sims, 284 Ky. 258, 144
S.W.2d 232 (1940). The doctrine requires both passage of time and express or implied acqui-
escence in the alleged wrong. Tracerlab, Inc. v. Industrial Nucleonics Corp., 313 F.2d 97 (1st
Cir. 1963).
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tural to medium-density residential.101 The plaintiffs contended that the
zoning amendment was invalid because it was based upon an invalid gen-
eral plan amendment. The Hawaii Supreme Court agreed.'
0 2
The court first dealt with the question of procedures for amending the
general plan. Noting that the charter's provisions for initial passage of the
plan (as an ordinance, which procedure has been changed to a resolution
under the revised charter) required submission to both the planning di-
rector and the planning commission before the council could consider it
(and an extraordinary majority council vote to override their recommen-
dations),0 3 the court held the same procedural safeguards were applicable
to amendments to the general plan as well.10 4 Similar procedural treat-
ment was necessary for amendments, said the court, to avoid defeating
the safeguards necessary to ensure the long-range and comprehensive na-
ture'0 5 of the planning process and its integrity."' The court then af-
101 51 Hawaii at 401, 462 P.2d at 201.
102 Id. at 416, 462 P.2d at 209.
103 Id. at 412, 462 P.2d at 206-07.
104 Id., 462 P.2d at 207:
The effect of these special procedures, applicable only to the general plan, is that when
the general plan is submitted to the council, the council is powerless to make additions
or changes without first referring its additions or changes to the planning director and
the planning commission for their recommendation. Without their recommendation, the
council may adopt such additions or changes "only by the affirmative vote of at least
two-thirds of its entire membership."
10I The meaning of "long-range" and "comprehensive" is clarified by reference to (1) ex-
pert testimony received by the charter commission in formulating § 5-509, and (2) the sup-
porting data of the general plan submitted by the planning commission to the council.
Shortly before adopting the requirement that the general plan be "long-range" and "com-
prehensive", the charter commission solicited and received the advice of a city planning
expert:
He believed that it should be the primary responsibility of the planning de-
partment to study, prepare and maintain a long range comprehensive general
plan to guide the physical development of the city on a current basis, which
would be recommended to the planning commission for further study and
which in turn, if agreed on, would be recommended for adoption by the policy
body. He believed it very important that the development and carrying out of
the general plan be spelled out in the charter, explaining that such a plan
should, of course, look forward to the needs of the community not for just one
or two years but twenty years hence, and which would have to do with matters
of traffic, police, fire, schools and playgrounds, land use, etc. Without a general
plan, which is also a policy statement concerning zoning and subdivisions,
there could be no long-range planning.
Minutes of the 64th Meeting of the Charter Commission held March 25, 1957, p. 2, on
file in the Public Archives, at Honolulu, State of Hawaii.
In the supporting data of the 1964 general plan, p. 48, it is stated:
Land uses proposed in this report and designated on Plate [sic] 39, the Gen-
eral Plan for the City and County of Honolulu, cover the next 20 years-as far
ahead as it is safe to predict.
B. To insure that the general plan would be "long-range" and "comprehensive", strin-
gent procedural hurdles were required to be overcome before a general plan could be
[Vol. 2
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firmed the critical relevance of the general plan. Based on the applicable
adopted. These hurdles are:
§ 5-503 ... The planning director shall:
(a) Prepare a general plan and development plans for the improvement and
development of the city.
§ 5-505. . . . The planning commission shall:
(b) Review the general plan and development plans and modifications
thereof developed by the director. The commission shall transmit such plans
with its recommendations thereon through the mayor to the council for its con-
sideration and action. The commission shall recommend approval in whole or
in part and with or without modifications or recommend rejection of such
plans.
§ 5-512 ...
1. The council shall adopt the general plan or any development plan by
ordinance.
4. Any addition to or change in the general plan proposed by the council
shall be referred by resolution to the planning director and the planning com-
mission for their recommendation prior to final action by the council. If the
commission disapproves the proposed change or addition, or recommends a
modification thereof, not accepted by the council, or fails to make its report
within the period of thirty days, the council may nevertheless adopt such addi-
tion or change, but only by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of its
entire membership.
Id. at 410-12, 462 P.2d at 206-07 (footnote omitted) (original emphasis). This language is no
longer contained in the applicable revised charter provisions pertaining to the general plan
(or, for that matter, development plans). Charter of the City and County of Honolulu art. V,
§ 5-408.
'o 51 Hawaii at 412-13, 462 P.2d at 207:
These stringent requirements for initial adoption of the general plan would be point-
less if the council's general power to amend were held applicable to the general plan. For
example, suppose that after the general plan had been prepared and recommended to
the council, five of the nine members of the council proposed to change the plan. Charter
§ 5-512.4 would require that this proposal be referred by resolution to the planning di-
rector and the planning commission. Without the approval of the commission, the five
councilmen would be powerless to adopt the change. But if the general plan could be
amended as the defendants here contend, the five councilmen could join the other coun-
cilmen and adopt the general plan without proposing any changes, and thereafter, the
five councilmen could promptly amend it in any manner they wished, subverting the
limitation expressed in charter § 5-512.4.
Id. at 415-16, 462 P.2d at 208-09:
A careful review of the legislative history of § 5-515 and of the other pertinent sections
of the charter compels this Court to conclude that the amendment process must meet
certain strict procedural hurdles. Looking at the totality of the problem before us with
the whole of Honolulu as one indivisible unit, we conclude that the better and correct
interpretation of charter § 5-515 requires that in the process of amending the general
plan, not only a public hearing is necessary but the council, the planning commission and
the planning director are required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the safe-
guards that were required in the initial adoption of the general plan. This interpretation
will not only meet the spirit of the law but fulfill the true intent of the laws covering the
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charter provisions, 10 7 the court concluded that "the charter commission
... wrote into the charter a specific prohibition against zoning ordi-
nances which do not conform to and implement the general plan."10 8 The
revised charter contains identical language, only substituting "develop-
ment plan" for "general plan."' 0 Presumably the court would make the
same comment with respect to development plans today.
Second, the court set out in detail what it regarded as minimum sub-
stantive criteria for amending of the general plan:
[Ailterations in the general plan must be comprehensive and long-range. More
specifically, if the city believes the general plan of 1964 is obsolete, then com-
prehensive updating of the 1964 plan's "studies of physical, social, economic
and governmental conditions and trends" is in order. If new study reveals,
among other things, (a) a housing shortage that was underestimated in the
1964 general plan, (b) the most rational solution to this housing shortage is
more apartments, (c) some of these new apartments should most rationally be
in Kailua, (d) the land set aside in the 1964 general plan for apartments in
Kailua must be increased to meet this need, and (e) the acreage in question in
this case is the best site for additional apartments (rather than some other site,
or rather than some other use for this land to fit some other need underesti-
mated in the 1964 plan); then the general plan may be amended to permit a
change in zoning.110
This last is particularly significant. The court seems to preclude a general
plan amendment meeting all of the appropriate procedural safeguards un-
less it is supported by studies demonstrating a sound basis for such
amendment."" While the opinion clearly addresses only the question of
general plan.
We conclude that the city's general power to amend ordinances is not applicable to the
general plan. The purpose of Honolulu Charter § 5-509 was to prevent the deterioration
of our environment by forcing the city to articulate long-range comprehensive planning
goals. The purpose of Honolulu Charter § 5-512.2 was to prevent the compromise of
these planning goals. These sections of the charter allow less room for the exertion of
pressure by powerful individuals and institutions. To allow amendment of the general
plan without any of the safeguards which were required in the adoption of the general
plan would subvert and destroy the progress which was achieved by the adoption of the
charter's sections on planning, and by their effectuation in the 1964 general plan.
1'0 Charter of the City and County of Honolulu art. V, § 5-512 (1959) provided in part:
1. The council shall adopt the general plan or any development plan by ordinance.
The general plan and all development plans shall be kept on file in the office of the
planning department.
2. No public improvement or project, or subdivision or zoning ordinance shall be ini-
tiated or adopted unless it conforms to and implements the general plan.
'08 51 Hawaii at 415, 462 P.2d at 208.
'*" Charter of the City and County of Honolulu art. V, § 5-412(3).
"10 51 Hawaii at 416-17, 462 P.2d at 209.
"I In this the court seems to foreshadow the emphasis on such studies in the approval of
certain growth management ordinances passed and judicially approved in New York,
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
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support for such amendments to the general plan, it is worth considering
whether such requirements would also be made of new or amended de-
tailed plans, the detailed land use map plans of today, and the new devel-
opment plans.
This may in part depend upon how the court will apply Dalton in view
of the changes in the revised charter of 1973. That charter now calls for a
general plan that is a broad statement of textual policies for long range
development which is adopted and amended by resolution, rather than a
comprehensive mapping of planned land uses that is adopted by ordi-
nance.1 1 2 As noted above, the requirement for consistency between plan-
ning and zoning has shifted to the local development plans.18 The devel-
opment plans (DPs) are required to be more detailed and shorter range
textual statements of principles and standards for implementing the gen-
eral plan, and while a map of the area covered by the plan is still re-
quired, it need no longer show planned land uses,1 " even though current
drafts of DPs do show them.1 1 5
In changing the nature of the general plan, the charter commission os-
tensibly intended to relieve the city of only the cumbersome procedural
burdens imposed by Dalton."6 The absence of a requirement that the
general plan be comprehensive and founded on detailed studies (which
was arguably the court's lever in Dalton for requiring that amendments
also be based on detailed studies) from the revised charter's definition of
the general plan and the DPs is more troublesome. The charter commis-
sion said it intended to move away from physical, end-state planning to a
process which included social planning as well.' 7 The question remains:
What is the status of the detailed, comprehensive studies requirement?
As the cases below suggest, it is likely they are still basic requirements as
the necessary support for plans to which future land use changes must
comply even though it is true that these former general plan require-
ments were not transferred to the DP requirements in the revised
charter."'
The court has considerably amplified its decision in Dalton in the dec-
ade since 1969. In Hall v. City & County of Honolulu,"9 the court dealt
(1972), and California, Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975).
I' Charter of the City and County of Honolulu art. V, § 5-408.
I's Id. § 5-412(3).
:' Id. § 5-409.
15 See, e.g., DEP'T OF GEN. PLANNING, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, DEVELOPMENT
PLAN ORDINANCE; PRIMARY URBAN CENTER (Draft, Sept. 1979).
Ile FINAL REPORT OF THE CHARTER COMMISSION, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, 1971-72,
at 24.
117 Id.
118 Charter of the City and County of Honolulu art. V, § 5-409. Minimally, the inquiry
shifts from their necessity as charter requirements to their necessity as indicia of a rational
basis for the development plans.
"9 56 Hawaii 121, 530 P.2d 737 (1975).
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with requirements for amending the DPs and the detailed land use maps
(DLUMs) which were to give specific and detailed land use direction
under the general guidance of the general plan. The court seemed to re-
quire that detailed studies accompany any modification or drawing up of
DPs and DLUMs by way of requiring a review of the general plan for the
area. The court reached this conclusion upon examination of pertinent
language in the revised charter together with a review of its decision in
Dalton.
The case arose upon a review of procedural requirements to amend the
general plan in the Diamond Head area. As part of proceedings to adopt a
DLUM and a DP for the area, the planning director recommended chang-
ing the general plan designation from residential to park. The change was
challenged both as to the adequacy of the hearings held and the studies
conducted. i 0 The court held the hearings were improper and stale. 2 1 As
to the plans and studies, the court sharply distinguished the general plan,
on the one hand, and the DPs and DLUMs, on the other:
The trial court has failed to take into consideration the important difference
that exists between the General Plan and the Development Plan, and the dif-
ference between the General Plan and the Detailed Land Use Map.
Clearly, under Charter Section 5-509 (1969), the General Plan provides, inter
alia, designated specific use of the land available within the City of Honolulu.
The Development Plan, under Charter Section 5-510 (1969), merely provides
the "detailed scheme for the placement or use of specific facilities within a
defined area so as to insure the most beneficial use of such area .... A devel-
opment plan is within the framework of and implements the general plan."
(Emphasis added.)
Evidence adduced at the trial shows that the Detailed Land Use Map merely
provides in more detail the specific boundaries of the various land use activi-
ties shown on the General Plan.'2
What follows from this distinction, however, is not so clear. The court
first declared that plans and studies in support of a DP or DLUM do not
suffice for the general plan because they are not sufficiently long range or
comprehensive. 22 The court then declared that in order to amend the
general plan (in this case presumably necessary) what was needed was
"[a]n updated comprehensive and long-range study of the General Plan
and of any amendments thereto."" "
But the nagging question remains: Having distinguished between a DP-
DLUM and a general plan, what is needed to draw up or change a DP-
DLUM for which no general plan amendment is necessary? Something,
120 Id. at 126-27, 530 P.2d 740-41.
:21 Id. at 128, 530 P.2d at 741.
I, d. at 127, 530 P.2d at 741 (original emphasis).
I d. at 128, 530 P.2d at 741.
124 Id.
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presumably; but what or how much is not yet clear. All we know for sure
is that the presumably shortrange studies of the type found in Hall will
not suffice for both general plan and DP-DLUM amendments, either or
both of which may be a necessary precedent to a zoning amendment:
The facts further show . . . seven to nine months from June 17, 1969, was
necessary for the preparation of a comprehensive and long-range study for
the proper consideration of an amendment to the general plan of the subject
area. No such study was ever submitted and considered before the enactment
of the amendment to the General Plan. 25
Next, in Akahane v. Fasi,'2 e the court addressed the question of who
makes the studies precedent to plan modification. The answer for all
three planning documents (general plan, DLUM, and DP) appears to be
the department of general planning (DGP) rather than the city council,
unless the DGP fails to respond to a legitimate city council request in a
timely manner.
The question of authority to perform studies to support plans arose
over a proposed contract between the city council and an independent
consultant for a study of that area along Ala Moana Boulevard between
Piikoi and Punchbowl Streets known as Kakaako. The city council was in
the process of formulating development policies for the Kakaako area
which would require amendments to all three planning documents as well
as zoning ordinances. To accomplish this the council intended to retain a
firm of planning consultants to review, evaluate, consolidate, and update
all the previous studies made by public agencies.""7 The administration
contended that the performance of such studies was an executive function
and therefore beyond the power of the council, a legislative body, under
traditional separation of powers principles.2 8
After reviewing the pertinent parts of the city charter,"' the court held
125 Id. (emphasis added).
1216 58 Hawaii 74, 565 P.2d 552 (1977).
I,7 Id. at 83, 565 P.2d at 558.
128 Id. at 79, 565 P.2d at 556.
'2 Id. at 82, 565 P.2d at 557:
Section 5-412 of the charter states, inter alia:
1. The council shall adopt the general plan or revisions thereof by resolution and
development plans or amendments thereto by ordinance. Resolutions adopting or revis-
ing the general plan shall be laid over for at least two weeks after introduction....
Upon adoption, every such resolution shall be presented to the mayor, and he may ap-
prove or disapprove it pursuant to applicable provisions governing the approval or disap-
proval of bills.
The general plan and all development plans shall be kept on file in the department of
general planning.
2. Any revision of or amendment to the general plan or any existing development
plan may be proposed by the council and shall be processed in the same manner as if
proposed by the chief planning officer. Any such revision or amendment shall be referred
to the chief planning officer and the planning commission by resolution. If the planning
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that, at least in the first instance, the responsibility for producing such
plans lay with the administration through its executive offices.13 The
charter enumerates general planning powers and reserves them, although
not exclusively to, executive agencies. And the executive branch is fully
staffed to expeditiously proceed with the reserved power. In part, this is
to avoid wasteful duplicate efforts.1 3 1 Therefore, the city council first for-
mally must request such a report or study, if it wants one, from the ad-
ministration, and there was no evidence of any such request by the coun-
cil here. 32 Following a request to the executive, the council is free to
contract for services on its own.
Where, however, after a proper request by the city council is made, the execu-
tive branch is uncooperative or has failed, within a reasonable period, to as-
sume and proceed with their responsibility, we are of the opinion that the city
council can and must assume the reserved, but not exclusive, powers of the
executive branch in the issue herein as an incidental exercise of their power to
amend or revise an existing general plan or development plan.
Moreover, where the executive branch has submitted to the city council pro-
posed general or development plans or revisions and amendments thereto, the
city council is necessarily empowered and authorized to employ consultants
with the necessary expertise to review, evaluate, consolidate, and to advise the
council on these various proposals.'u
The Hawaii Supreme Court has also discussed the applicability of the
Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act (HAPA)3s to the decisions of Hon-
olulu's chief planning officer (CPO) in Kailua Community Council v. City
commission disapproves the proposed revision or amendment or recommends a modifica-
tion thereof, not accepted by the council, or fails to make its report within the period of
thirty days, the council may nevertheless adopt such revision or amendment, but only by
the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of its entire membership.
:I* Id. at 83-84, 565 P.2d at 558.
Id. at 86, 565 P.2d at 559-60:
The above procedure would avoid duplication of costs which the taxpayers of this
State would sustain if each branch of government had an independent power to proceed
with the primary responsibilities and duties of the other. It should be made clear that
the holding in this case does not foreclose the city council from obtaining this assistance
because the information obtained might also be relevant to the formulation by the exec-
utive branch of an original general plan and/or development plan. Our opinion herein
would further avoid a competitive situation between the branches and would also pre-
vent a complete bypassing of the executive responsibility thereby diluting or damaging
to a point of impotency the executive responsibility.
:32 Id. at 85, 565 P.2d at 559.
33 Id. There was a strong dissent by Chief Justice Richardson and Justice Kidwell, prin-
cipally on the ground that council should be free to obtain whatever help it needs in making
legislative decisions, including the changing of the general plan. Whether this same informa-
tion related to the DP process was therefore irrelevant. Id. at 87, 565 P.2d at 560 (Kidwell,
J., dissenting, joined by Richardson, C.J.).
3 HAwAn REv. STAT. ch. 91 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
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& County of Honolulu.18 5 The case revolved around the CPO's promulga-
tion of Instructions for Requesting Amendments to the General Plan for
the City and County of Honolulu. The instructions set out application
procedures together with data to be submitted by an applicant.3'8 There
was no evidence the rules were formally adopted as set out in HAPA.
1 8 7
Subsequently, the CPO forwarded a recommendation for a general plan
amendment to the city council, which passed appropriate ordinances in
accordance with the recommendation, over plaintiff's objections."' s Plain-
tiff then challenged the ordinances on the ground they were based on ad-
ministrative rulemaking proceedings subject to HAPA, which had not
been followed."'
The court, however, held HAPA inapplicable on the facts of this
case.1 40 The court divided the CPO's duties into two categories: (1) Those
determinations of public and private rights, in which he may be required
to conform to HAPA;'14 and (2) those "intimately connected with the en-
actment of municipal legislation affecting the general plan and the devel-
opment plans of the city." 4 2 In this latter category, HAPA does not apply
because the final action is in the hands of the council and hence legisla-
tive in character. The court described the CPO's role in these situations
as purely advisory and factfinding. Only the final action of the council
affects the interests of the public. The function of the CPO in this process
is analogous to that of a legislative committee." '
'" 60 Hawaii 428, 591 P.2d 602 (1979). Although the actions of the planning officer oc-
curred in 1970, and HAPA has since been amended, the court's analysis would apply to the
current statute.
131 Id. at 429, 591 P.2d at 603.
137 Id.
Id. at 430, 591 P.2d at 604.
131 Id. at 430-31, 591 P.2d at 604.
140 Id. at 431, 591 P.2d at 604:
The determinative issue in this case is, whether the CPO, in processing applications
for amendments or revisions to the general plan or development plans of the city, was
subject to the provisions of the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act. HRS Chapter 91.
We agree with the defendants-appellants that in these situations the HAPA is not appli-
cable to the CPO.
141 Id.
14 Id. at 432, 591 P.2d at 605.
143 Id. at 432-33, 591 P.2d at 605-06:
[Tihe final operative act giving legal effect to the proposal is the legislative action of the
city council. The City Charter vests in the city council sole legislative power in municipal
affairs. R.C.H. § 3-101 (1973). It also requires that revisions to the general plan be effec-
tuated by council resolution and amendments to the development plans by ordinance.
R.C.H. § 5-412 (1973). Thus, whether amendments or revisions are to be made is within
the absolute discretion of the city council in the exercise of its legislative function. Its
actions on the proposals are the only acts declarative of and affecting the interests of the
public.
In fulfilling his responsibility in this legislative process, the CPO serves as the initial
factfinder for the city council, and he is in that sense performing a function which a
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B. Planning in a Statewide Context
It is not the purpose of this section to detail the creation and operation
of Hawaii's State Land Use Law, which has been more than adequately
and elaborately described in a host of books,"' articles, 4 5 and reports 4"
over the past dozen years. Suffice it to say that by statute 47 Hawaii di-
vides all the lands in the State into four zones: agriculture, conservation,
rural, and urban. The State controls both the classification system and
the use of land in the first zone, and shares some of that control with the
counties in the second and third. Local government (counties, in Hawaii,
as there are no separately incorporated cities or villages) controls the use
of land within the urban zone.14
An amendment to the State Land Use Law concerning land use com-
mission standards for deciding boundary amendment applications also
provides that no such amendment could be adopted unless it conforms to
the state plan. 49 This, together with statements in the newly enacted Ha-
waii State Plan,150 give the plan considerable significance in Hawaii.
1. State Plan. - The Hawaii State Plan is divided into three major
parts dealing with objectives and policies, 51 planning implementation
and coordination' 52 and priority directions. 5s It is the second part deal-
ing with planning implementation and coordination that is most signifi-
cant for purposes of land use control and management. This is so because
of the language contained in the Hawaii Revised Statutes: "The decisions
legislative committee would normally perform. He reviews applications for revisions and
amendments, R.C.H. § 5-403 (1973), and makes his recommendations to the planning
commission which in turn reviews the proposals and transmits its own recommendations
to the city council. Throughout this process, the CPO and the planning commission are
performing a purely advisory function.
The court cited Melemanu Woodlands Community Ass'n v. Koga, 56 Hawaii 235, 533 P.2d
867 (1975), in support of this last proposition. There, the court held an action for injunction
to stop the council from considering a recommendation from the planning commission (on a
planned unit development ordinance) was premature as the recommendation was "advi-
sory." Id. at 239, 533 P.2d at 870.
144 See, e.g., THE QuiEr REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at ch. 1; MANDELKER, supra note 1, at
ch. VII; ZONING HAWAII, supra note 1.
"' See, e.g., Whither Hawaii, supra note 2; Callies & Dinell, Land Use Control in an
Island State, 3 THIRD WORLD PLAN. REV. - (1980) (forthcoming publication); Selinger, Van
Dyke, Amano, Takenaka & Young, Selected Constitutional Issues Related to Growth Man-
agement in the State of Hawaii, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 639 (1978).
146 See, e.g., EcKco, DEAN, AUSTIN & WILLIAMS, STATE OF HAWAII LAND USE DISTRICTS AND
REGULATIONS REVIEW (1969).
HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 205 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
4 See THE QuIET REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at ch. 1.
149 Act 4, 1976 Hawaii Sess. Laws 4, 5-6 (codified at HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-4(h) (1976)).
'6 HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 226 (Supp. 1979).
161 Id. §§ 226-5 to -28.
'6' Id. §§ 226-51 to -63.
10M Id. §§ 226-101 to -104.
[Vol. 2
LAND USE SURVEY
made by the state land use commission shall be in conformance with the
overall theme, goals, objectives, policies, and priority directions contained
within this chapter, and the state functional plans adopted pursuant to
this chapter.""" Thus it is that after the adoption of those functional
plans the state's major land use decisionmaking body will be bound by
the state plan and its subordinate functional plans in its boundary change
decisions.'55 Moreover, the Hawaii State Board of Land and Natural Re-
sources, which has the authority to decide what uses shall be made of
both public and private land in the thousands of acres of land classified
as conservation under the State Land Use Law, is similarly subject to the
pertinent functional plans and the state plan.' 6
While broad policy outlines are sketched in the state plan, it is the
functional plan to which one must look for detailed direction. The state
plan provides for the preparation of twelve such plans to be eventually
adopted by the legislature by concurrent resolution.157 The initial respon-
sibility for preparing each functional plan lies with named state agen-
cies' 58 which are required to submit their plans periodically to an advi-
sory committee 59 and policy council,' 60 each of which is entitled by
statute to have its recommendations accompany the functional plan to
the legislature for action.16' So far, the legislature has adopted no func-
tional plans, but most are due to be submitted in time for consideration
by the 1980 legislature. '
--- Id. § 226-52(b)(2)(D).
'55 Nor is this the only effect on the use of land. It is common knowledge - and rather
obvious - that a minimum level of so-called infrastructure improvements are generally held
to be necessary for the development of raw land. Id. §§ 226-52(b)(2)(A) to -52(b)(2)(B) re-
quire that the appropriation of funds under both the biennial and supplemental budgets, as
well as the capital improvements program, be subject to the state plan and functional plans
as well.
5 Id. § 226-52(b)(2)(E).
117 Id. § 226-52(a)(3) provides:
State functional plans shall be prepared for, but not limited to, the areas of agriculture,
conservation lands, education, energy, higher education, health, historic preservation,
housing, recreation, tourism, transportation, and water resources development. State
functional plans shall define, implement, and be in conformance with the overall theme,
goals, objectives, policies, and priority directions contained within this chapter. County
general plans and development plans shall be used as a basis in the formulation of state
functional plans.
Id. § 226-57(a) mandates the adoption of functional plans and amendments thereto by con-
current resolution.
18 Id. § 226-57(a).
15 Id.
180 Id. § 226-58. Form and content are set out in some detail in draft administrative
guidelines issued by the state department of planning and economic development as staff to
the policy council and as required by the state plan under subsection 55(10).
101 Id. §§ 226-57(c), -58(b).
12 At this writing (March 1980) it appears that none of the functional plans will be
adopted this year. Interim guidelines for the use of the LUC have been drafted, see H.B.
1775-80, 10th Hawaii Leg., 2d Sess. (1980), and likely will become law by the end of the
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2. County Plans. - The state plan, which is in effect a statutory in-
strument, also requires that each county adopt a two-part planning sys-
tem, wherein a series of area-specific DPs fit into a general plan:
County general plans shall indicate desired population and physical develop-
ment patterns for each county and regions within each county. In addition,
county general plans or development plans shall address the unique problems
and needs of each county and regions within each county. County general
plans or development plans shall further define, implement, and be in con-
formance with the overall theme, goals, objectives, policies, and priority direc-
tions contained within this chapter. State functional plans which have been
adopted by concurrent resolution by the legislature shall be utilized as guide-
lines in amending the county general plans to be in conformance with the over-
all theme, goals, objectives, and priority directions. 68
Such plans now are required by the state plan, and hence state law, to
contain certain elements by January of 1982:
§ 226-61 County general plans; preparation. (a) The county general plans
and development plans shall be formulated with input from the state and
county agencies as well as the general public.
County general plans or development plans shall indicate desired population
and physical development patterns for each county and regions within each
county. In addition, county general plans or development plans shall address
the unique problems and needs of each county and regions within each county.
The county general plans or development plans shall further define and imple-
ment applicable provisions of this chapter, provided that any amendment to
the county general plan of each county shall not be contrary to the county
charter. The formulation, amendment, and implementation of county general
plans or development plans shall utilize as guidelines, statewide objectives, pol-
icies, and programs stipulated in state functional plans adopted in consonance
with this chapter.
(b) County general plans shall be formulated on the basis of sound ratio-
nale, data, analyses, and input from state and county agencies and the general
public, and contain objectives and policies as required by the charter of each
county. Further, the county general plans should:
(1) Contain objectives to be achieved and policies to be pursued with re-
spect to population density, land use, transportation system loca-
tion, public and community facility locations, water and sewage
system locations, visitor destinations, urban design and all other
matters necessary for the coordinated development of each county
and regions within each county.
(2) Contain implementation priorities and actions to carry out policies to
include but not be limited to, land use maps, programs, projects,
regulatory measures, standards and principles and interagency co-
current legislative session.
I" HAWAII REv. STAT. § 226-52(a)(4) (Supp. 1979). As discussed at length supra, the City
and County of Honolulu already has such plans.
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ordination provisions.
(c) The county general plans and development plans shall be in conform-
ance with the overall theme, goals, objectives, policies, and priority directions
contained in this chapter by January, 1982.'"
3. Potential Conflicts Between State and County Plans. - A trouble-
some issue is the potential conflict between the state plan and the county
plans. Each relates to the other. The state plan requires that "[c]ounty
general plans and development plans shall be used as a basis in the for-
mulation of state functional plans."" 5 But it also states: "State functional
plans which have been adopted by concurrent resolution by the legisla-
ture shall be utilized as guidelines in amending the county general plans
to be in conformance with the overall themes, goals and objectives, and
priority directions [of the state plans]. 166
The question is, which takes precedence? The administrative guidelines
issued by the Hawaii State Department of Planning and Economic Devel-
opment address the question but do not resolve it.1 17 Only in a single
instance is the conflict potentially resolved in the state plan statute. The
legislature may site a "specific project" regardless of county general plans
to the contrary, upon a finding of "overriding state concern". 68
In counties where there is not yet a general plan which meets the statu-
tory criteria, the issue may never arise if the State legislature passes con-
current resolutions adopting all or most of the functional plans before
such county plans are formulated. But what of the State's most populous
county, Honolulu? Here there is a general plan in place, 8 9 and the city
council is moving rapidly toward the adoption of new DPs.17 0 What, for
example, would be the status of land use controls adopted by Honolulu,
regulating the redevelopment of Kakaako if, based upon the Oahu Gen-
eral Plan and a DP for that area, they conflicted with a state functional
plan for tourism approved (by joint resolution) of the legislature and in
accordance with the state plan? Could the State claim the county plans
failed to conform to the state plan or use the functional plan as a guide-
line? But then, could the county - a home rule unit of local government
- claim with equal right that the functional plan failed to utilize the
I- Id. § 226-61.
165 Id. § 226-52(a)(3).
166 Id. § 226-52(a)(4).
107 HAWAII DEP'T OF PLANNING & EcONOMIc DEV., THE HAWAII STATE PLAN ADMINISTRA-
TIVE GUIDELINES 1-3 (Draft, June, 1979): "The formulation and amendment of State Func-
tional Plans must conform to the State Plan and utilize as guidelines County General
Plans and Development Plans.... The formulation, amendment and implementation of
County Plans must conform to the State Plan and utilize as guidelines the State Func-
tional Plans." (emphasis added).
168 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 226-59(b) (Supp. 1979).
169 GENERAL PLAN: CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU (Res. No. 238, Jan. 18, 1977).
170 Smyser, The Fight Over Development, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Oct. 10, 1979, at A-14,
col. 2.
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county's general plan and DP as guidelines in its formulation? 1 7  Note
this is not merely a matter of conflict between plans and land use con-
trols. Each jurisdiction's land use controls are bound by the contents of
the respective plans.
III. BOUNDARY AMENDMENTS: THE CHARACTER OF STATE ZONING
CHANGES
Cases in the last decade have tended to focus on the manner in which
reclassification takes place. The question of standards and facts relied
upon to support such reclassifications runs through those reported deci-
sions. As discussed in the preceding Part IIB, the new state plan, 1 7 to-
gether with the subject-specific functional plans, will provide the basis for
these and other land use decisions.17 3 This section addresses these two
major areas of activity.
Authority to reclassify land among the four districts described in Part
IIB rests with Hawaii's land use commission (LUC).17 These changes are
generally referred to as "boundary amendments". The manner in which
the LUC made such changes was apparently subject to considerable pub-
lic criticism,' 75 finally resulting in the landmark case of Town v. Land
Use Commission.'7 6 Not only did the case decide the character of bound-
ary amendments (whether legislative or quasi-judicial), but in light of re-
cent decisions elsewhere, it may have inadvertently decided whether such
decisions will ever be subject to binding initiative and referendum as well.
The case arose out of Town's objection to the LUC's delay in deciding a
boundary amendment application (from agricultural to rural) which af-
fected his property and to the LUC's taking of applicant testimony out of
his presence.17 7 The former - delay - was contrary to specific regulatory
language requiring the LUC to render a decision within forty-five to
ninety days of a required hearing. 78 The latter was contrary to the re-
quirements of HAPA.' 79 The LUC answered that a petitioner could waive
M While failing to resolve this issue legislatively, the legislature apparently did foresee
potential conflict between the State and the counties on the location of various projects. The
legislature expressly reserved to itself the power to override county plans in those situations.
See note 168 and accompanying text supra. Perhaps this type of solution should be utilized
to settle the land use control question as well.
M' Act 100, 1978 Hawaii Sess. Laws 136 (signed into law on May 22, 1978) (codified at
HAWAII REv. STAT. ch. 226 (Supp. 1979)), reprinted in HAWAII DEP'T OF PLANNING & ECO-
NOMic DEv., THE HAWAII STATE PLAN (1978).
173 HAwAn REv. STAT. § 226-52 (Supp. 1979).
.7. Id. § 205-2 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
1"5 See MANDLKzR, supra note 1, at 309.
" 55 Hawaii 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974).
- Id. at 539, 524 P.2d at 86.
178 State Land Use District Regulation 2.35.
" HAWAI REv. STAT. ch. 91 (1968) (amended 1973, 1978).
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the right to a decision within the time period (as here) and that HAPA
was inapplicable as boundary amendments constituted "rulemaking"
rather than a "contested case." ' The court disagreed on both points.
The matter of delay was dealt with speedily. The court noted there was
no provision for varying the time period; the language was clearly direc-
tory and mandatory. Moreover, to hold otherwise put objectors "in a state
of limbo at the discretion of the applicant." 181 Allowing a petitioner to
pick and choose the LUC meeting at which his petition would be decided
places an objector, like Town, in an impossible position.' 8 '
More far reaching in the decision was the characterization of the
boundary amendment process as quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legisla-
tive. The court said:
We are of the opinion that the adoption of district boundaries classifying
lands into conservation, agricultural, rural or urban districts, or the amend-
ment to said district boundaries is not a rule making process within the mean-
ing of the above cited definition .... It logically follows that the process for
boundary amendment is not rule making or quasi-legislative, but is adjudica-
tive of legal rights of property interests in that it calls for the interpretation of
facts applied to rules that have already been promulgated by the legislature.
HRS § 91-1(5) defines "contested case" as: proceeding in which the
legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law
to be determined after an opportunity for agency hearing.
We are of the opinion that the instant case is a "contested case" within the
definition cited above. The appellant has a property interest in the amending
of a district boundary when his property adjoins the property that is being
redistricted. East Diamond Head Association v. Zoning Board, 52 Hawaii 518,
479 P.2d 796 (1971); Dalton v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 400,
462 P.2d 199 (1969). Therefore, any action taken on the petition for boundary
change is a proceeding in which appellant has legal rights as a specific and
interested party and is entitled by law to have a determination on those
rights.183
It then held that the contested case procedures of HAPA applied. " As
HAPA specifically granted parties such as Town the right to cross-ex-
amine witnesses'8 5 and forbade the presenting of additional evidence
without notice to parties such as Town,'" the LUC's hearing a witness in
Town's absence and the acting chairman's "field investigation" evidence
55 Hawaii at 545, 524 P.2d at 89.
'Si Id. at 544, 524 P.2d at 88.
"' Id. at 545, 524 P.2d at 89.
"' Id. at 546-48, 524 P.2d at 90-91.
'" Id. at 548, 524 P.2d at 91.
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 91-9(c), -10(3) (1968).
'" Id. § 91-10(4).
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rendered the LUC's decision invalid.187
It is this characterization of boundary amendments as quasi-judicial
that is critical. Indeed, by including even initial classifications and
changes regardless of size, the court may have cast too wide a net. For
decades standard local zoning theory held that so-called map amend-
ments were legislative in character.188 Not only did this usually render
local administrative procedure acts inapplicable (therefore requiring
courts to hear most cases contesting such rezonings in lengthy de novo
proceedings rather than abbreviated administrative appeals), it also made
such activities subject to initiative and referendum, where such proce-
dures were available. It is, however, generally agreed that neither is avail-
able for the recall of a quasi-judicial decision, by whatever manner or
agency made, on the ground the general public has no legitimate interest
in the outcome of a contested case. 189 Under this theory, then, the court
has virtually insulated all the land use decisions involving boundary
changes (translate: map amendments, which are identical to zoning map
changes at the local level) from initiative and referendum. Should they be
so exempt? It is, one would expect, perfectly reasonable to insulate as
contested cases those decisions involving land areas so small that no one
but the immediate parties should be concerned. But what of major
boundary changes? Can it really be said that a reclassification of, say,
upwards of 100 acres for an industrial park, a college campus, a theme
park, or a new community is merely a contested case, quasi-judicial in
nature and beyond any applicable referendum or recall? It is likely the
court did not have in mind such a situation when it rendered its decision
in Town. Perhaps the opinion should be restricted only to the class of
cases similar to the case before the court in Town, that is cases which
involve small land area and lack issues of real public interest.190
8 55 Hawaii at 549, 524 P.2d at 91-92.
See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 576, 579, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973);
1 WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at §§ 33.02, 16.03.
"I See Callies, The Supreme Court is Wrong About Zoning by Popular Vote, 42 PLAN-
NING 17 (1976). See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668
(1976) (upholding a mandatory referendum procedure applicable to all zoning decisions.
The character of the zoning decision, which involved an eight-acre parcel, was only an issue
for dissenting Justice Stevens, who viewed it as "administrative," id. at 692, and therefore
inappropriate for referendum procedures); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 576,
507 P.2d 23 (1973) (rezoning of a 32-acre parcel is "quasi-judicial" in nature). But cf. Neu-
berger v. City of Portland, - Or. -, 603 P.2d 771 (1979) (rezoning of 601 acre parcel, owned
by relatively few individuals and involving application of existing policy to specific facts,
was quasi-judicial function).
'90 The implications of an unmodified Town decision for initiative and referendum in Ha-
waii are, of course, conjectural. Hawaii does not presently have initiative or referendum at
the state level, although the possibility has been considered in recent years. See, e.g., S.B.
390, 10th Hawaii Leg., 1st Sess. (1979). The immediate implication of the Town quasi-judi-
cial characterization of the LUC decisions is in the procedures followed by the commission.
In fact, the case led to a revision in 1975 of the State Land Use Law to incorporate the
contested case provisions of HAPA. Act 193, 1975 Hawaii Sess. Laws 441, 443 (codified at
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Another major recent case affecting state land use decisionmaking is
Save Hawaiiloa Ridge Association v. Land Use Commission'91 where the
procedural issue of standing was raised. The issue is a critical one, given
the predilection of citizens' groups to raise important land use and envi-
ronmental issues which often extend beyond the narrow interests of the
applicant for a boundary change. The court held that owners of land on
the periphery of property which such owners sought to have "reclassified"
had no standing to so petition."' The court reasoned that the statutory
language "any property owner" '' meant any property owner of the par-
cel in question. 9"4 The court noted this accorded with a subsequent
amendment clarifying this interpretation."15 The result was a somewhat
chilling effect upon such citizens' group actions on behalf of the
environment.
The court may have had second thoughts on the standing question in
the recently decided Life of the Land, Inc. v. Land Use Commission.'"
Life of the Land (LOL) had sought to challenge a LUC boundary reclas-
sification of some 532 acres of land from the agricultural to the urban
district classification under the State Land Use Law."17 The court noted
that both HAPA198 and its own prior decisions'" demonstrated a trend
towards a permissive definition of standing, especially when the environ-
ment is at issue:
As illustrated by the above cases, this court has in recent years recognized
the importance of aesthetic and environmental interests and has allowed those
who show aesthetic and environmental injury standing to sue where their
aesthetic and environmental interests are "personal" and "special", or where
a property interest is also affected."'0
With this meaningful preface, the court found that LOL did indeed have
HAwAII R.v. STAT. § 205-4 (1976)). For a discussion of the procedural and substantive
changes wrought by Act 193, see MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 308-12.
191 57 Hawaii 84, 549 P.2d 737 (1976).
12 Id. at 86, 549 P.2d at 738.
193 HAWAII REv. STAT. § 205-4(a) (1968 & Supp. 1972) (amended 1975, 1976).
1 57 Hawaii at 85, 549 P.2d at 738.
195 Id.; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-4(a) (1976) now provides, in part: "[Any person with a
property interest in the land sought to be reclassified, may petition the land use commission
for a change in the boundary of a district."
" 61 Hawaii -, 594 P.2d 1079 (1979).
"o HAwAIi REv. STAT. ch. 205 (1968 & Supp. 1974) (amended each year thereafter). The
reclassification decision arose under the LUC's periodic review of districts, see HAwAH REV.
STAT. § 205-11 (1968) (repealed 1975). The commission no longer conducts periodic reviews.
105 Id. § 91-14(a) (1968 & Supp. 1975).
"'In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975); Waianae Model Neigh-
borhood Area Ass'n v. City & County of Honolulu, 55 Hawaii 40, 514 P.2d 861 (1973); East
Diamond Head Ass'n v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 52 Hawaii 518, 479 P.2d 796 (1971); Dalton
v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969).
'*" 61 Hawaii at -, 594 P.2d at 1082 (emphasis added).
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standing both as an "aggrieved party" and in a "contested case," as re-
quired under HAPA.
The fact that some of LOL's members lived in an area adjoining the
subject property was sufficient to establish LOL as a party "specifically,
personally and adversely affected by the agency's action."' 0 1 Two of those
members owned residences in the area. The court also noted that LOL's
members generally used the area for diving, swimming, hiking, camping,
sightseeing, exploring, and hunting, and that:
[Fluture urbanization will destroy beaches and open space now enjoyed by
members and decrease agricultural land presently used for the production of
needed food supplies. Appellant contends that construction will have an ad-
verse effect on its members and on the environment, and that pursuits pres-
ently enjoyed will be irrevocably lost.202
The court held that the proceedings in which LOL participated also
qualified for "contested case" status, despite the fact it did not partici-
pate in the so-called judicial portion of the hearings, since the LUC did
not permit any property owners to so appear and participate: "We hold
that, given the LUC's restrictions on access to the judicial portion of its
hearings, appellant should not be penalized for failing to participate in
the judicial portion. Therefore we hold that in each of these cases appel-
lant's participation amounted to participation in a contested case."'203
This decision has clearly expanded judicial notions of what is necessary to
surmount the standing hurdle for citizens' action and environmental or-
ganizations who cannot show a direct property interest in a land use dis-
pute governed by HAPA.2"
IV. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS: OF COASTAL ZONES AND
NAVIGABLE WATERS
This survey would be incomplete without reference to two significant
01 Id.
2 Id.
103 Id., 594 P.2d at 1083.
200 Indeed, my colleague Jon Van Dyke, a constitutional law scholar, has been moved to
note that:
This recent decision thus puts Hawaii law in close conformity with Federal law, relaxing
the standing requirement in suits involving the environment because of a recognition of
the important public interest involved in decisions affecting the environment. Only a
token formal inquiry is now needed to permit a plaintiff to challenge actions that affect
our fragile environment.
Hearings before the House Committees on the Judiciary and on Ecology and Environmental
Protection, August 27, 10th Hawaii Leg., 1st Sess. (1979) (interim hearing) (statement of
Jon Van Dyke).
Thus federal law would appear to be, as Professor Van Dyke notes, United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), as it modifies Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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cases from Hawaii finding their resolution in the federal courts. While
each deals with subjects on the periphery of land use management and
control, they are, as federal cases, worth at least brief mention, particu-
larly the litigation recently culminated in the Supreme Court decision in
Kaiser-Aetna v. United Statesaoa
A. United States v. Kaiser-Aetna: The "Publicking" of a Private
Pond
During the 1960's the late Henry J. Kaiser conceived the development
of 6000 acres of leased land 06 into a new residential community approxi-
mately twelve miles from downtown Honolulu. The proposed develop-
ment, called Hawaii Kai, fronts for hundreds of yards on Maunalua Bay.
Much of the land area is, however, separated from the ocean by what
remains of an ancient Hawaiian fishpond known as Kuapa Pond. 20 7 In its
1 48 U.S.L.W. 4045 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1979) (No. 78-738), rev'g, 584 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1978),
aff'g and rev'g in part, 408 F. Supp. 42 (D. Hawaii 1976).
20' The land, including the pond discussed below, was and is owned in fee simple by the
Bernice P. Bishop Estate, a charitable trust whose income supports the local Kamehameha
Schools for Hawaiians. As the name of the trust implies, its res consists of the estate of
Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop as a descendent of the recipient of large trusts of land
(known as ahupua'a) granted by King Kamehameha III at the 1848 land division known as
the Great Mahele. United States v. Kaiser-Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 47, afJ'd and rev'd in
part, 584 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4045 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1979) (No. 78-738).
See generally J. CHINEN, THE GREAT MAHELE: HAWAII's LAND DIvSION OF 1848 (1958).
107 The ponds were a part of early Hawaiian fishing, as discussed below by the district
court:
KuapA Pond covered 523 acres and extended approximately 2 miles inland from
Maunalua Bay and the Pacific Ocean on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. The pond was con-
tiguous to Maunalua Bay, the latter being navigable water of the United States.
A not uncommon barrier beach delineated Kuapi Pond from the bay. The area proba-
bly was a stream mouth prior to the end of the ice age, at which time the rise in sea level
caused the shoreline to retreat from a position that is now submerged by Maunalua Bay,
and is marked by the reef edge. Partial erosion of the headlands adjacent to the bay
formed sediment which accreted to form the barrier beach at the mouth of the pond,
creating a lagoon.
Early Hawaiians used that lagoon as a fishpond and reinforced the natural sand bar
with stone walls where the tidal flows in and out of the ancient lagoon occurred. Approx-
imately two-thirds of the pond's water came from the sea. Runoff waters from the sur-
rounding mountains provided the balance. Part of the seawater present in the pond per-
colated through the barrier beach. As indicated above, for the area's use as a fishpond
the barrier was incomplete in its normal state. Wave and tidal action from the sea and
occasional heavy fresh water flow breached the sand barrier and allowed the ocean tides
to flood the pond.
Recorded history prior to annexation of Hawaii and geological evidence indicate two
openings from the pond to Maunalua Bay. The fishpond's managers placed removable
sluice gates in the stone walls across these openings. During high tide, water from the
bay and ocean entered the pond through the gates. During low tide, the current flow
reversed toward the ocean.
The Hawaiians utilized the tidal action in the pond to raise and catch fish, primarily
1979]
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natural state, the pond is closed to the ocean. However, in the course of
development, Kaiser-Aetna dredged a channel from the ocean through
the coral "wall" into the pond and widened it to permit access to the
pond for "pleasure" boats.2 08 The "shore" of the pond is now lined with
1500 residential lots, many having their own boat docking facilities.20 9
It is this improvement to the pond that gave rise to litigation. As the
federal district court found, Hawaiian fishponds always have been consid-
ered private property both by landowners and by the State of Hawaii.210
However, having made Kuapa Pond navigable, Kaiser-Aetna found the
United States Army Corps of Engineers not only asserting federal juris-
diction over it as navigable waters of the United States but also claiming
a public navigational easement had thus been created, which gave the
public rights to enter the pond without the consent of Kaiser-Aetna.2 1 '
The Federal District Court for the District of Hawaii, after a long dis-
course on Hawaiian history as it related to fishponds and the current dis-
pute," 2 found that Kaiser-Aetna had indeed made the pond navigable
waters of the United States.2"' However, it refused to grant the United
States an injunction to prevent Kaiser-Aetna from denying public access
thereto. 4 Both sides appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld in part and reversed
in part, agreeing in full with the contentions of the Federal Government.
First, it reviewed the contention of Kaiser-Aetna as to navigability. Citing
previous federal cases defining navigability, the court noted that the pre-
mullet. During ebb tides, the sluice gates allowed water but not large fish to escape, thus
"flushing" and enriching the pond while preserving the crop. Water depths in the pond
varied up to 2 feet at high tide. Large areas of land at the inland end were completely
exposed at low tide. The fishermen harvested the pond with the aid of shallowdraft ca-
noes or boats, but the barrier beach and stone walls prevented boat travel directly there-
from to the open bay.
United States v. Kaiser-Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 46, aff'd and rev'd in part, 584 F.2d 378
(9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4045 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1979) (No. 78-738). For a discussion of
ancient Hawaiian water rights, see Van Dyke, Chang, Aipa, Higham, Marsden, Sur,
Tagamori & Yukumoto, Water Rights in Hawaii, in LAND AND WATER RESOURCE MANAGE-
MENT IN HAWAII 141, 146-75 (Hawaii Institute for Management and Analysis in Government
1979) [hereinafter cited as Water Rights in Hawaii].
108 408 F. Supp. at 47.
109 Id. at 48.
210 Id. at 46.
"I United States v. Kaiser-Aetna, 584 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W.
4045 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1979) (No. 78-738); 408 F. Supp. at 52.
"11 408 F. Supp. at 46-47.
113 Id. at 49-51.
214 Id. at 51-54. The court implies that whereas Kaiser-Aetna could not necessarily ex-
clude the public, given its use of the property as a marina, it had the right, as owner of the
pond, to regulate that public use and charge tolls and fees. The court denied the claim that
the public automatically acquired a servitude over the pond by virtue of its new character as
navigable waters of the United States. For such a servitude the United States would have to
pay compensation. Id. at 53-54.
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vious status of the pond and the land thereunder could have no bearing
on the jurisdiction of the United States over navigable waters. 15 The sole
question was whether the waterway in question is presently navigable.' e
How it became so, whether naturally or, as here, by artificial means, was
irrelevant,"'7 even if the Engineers "acquiesced" in the improvements
making it navigable.' 1s As to the question of navigability, the court held
that there was little doubt that the pond became navigable since over 600
boats were using the waterway.' 1 '
The court next turned to the question of public use of the pond. Em-
phasizing the loss of character as a fishpond once Kaiser-Aetna trans-
formed the pond into a marina," 0 the court first refused to separate fed-
eral regulatory authority over navigable waters and the right of public use
because "[iut is the public right of navigational use that renders regula-
tory control necessary in the public interest."
'
"21
Therefore, it followed that the public right of use is a characteristic
which attaches automatically to all navigable waters of the United States,
and it does not represent an independent taking or seizure for which Kai-
ser-Aetna would be entitled to compensation:
Secondly, the federal navigational servitude and the public right of use are
not imposed or appropriated by action of the government in the nature of
seizure. They exist as characteristics of all navigable waters of the United
States. [citations omitted.] Land underlying navigable water differs from fast
I15 United States v. Kaiser-Aetna, 584 F.2d 378, 382 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W.
4045 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1979) (No. 78-738).
216 Id. at 382-83.
117 Id. at 383.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 381.
120 Id. at 383. See also the district court's findings of fact on this issue, 408 F. Supp. at
47-48:
Since development of the marina, 668 boats have been registered and authorized to use
the pond. Kaiser-Aetna oversees the operations of the marina and has generally excluded
all "commercial" vessels, although it has not yet decided whether or not businesses in
the shopping center that abuts the marina may operate commercial vessels.
Kaiser-Aetna owns and operates a small vessel within the marina, the "Marina
Queen", which can carry up to 25 persons. During 1967-72, Kaiser-Aetna operated the
Marina Queen primarily to show Hawaii-Kai to possible subdevelopers and purchasers of
homes or homesites. On Sundays, they invited the general public to join the cruises.
During 1973, the marina shopping center merchants' association took over operation of
the Marina Queen. The ship ran six or seven times a day for the purpose of attracting
people to the marina shoreside and adjoining shopping facilities. As a part of the general
promotion, Kaiser-Aetna chartered buses to pick up tourists at various points in Waikiki
and transport them to the marina area. The tourists were given a special package of shop
discounts and a ride on the Marina Queen, for which they paid $1 and later $2 per
person for the package. During the period, 18,254 tourists and a total of 38,821 persons
rode the Marina Queen. The boat ride was available without charge to anyone who came
to the marina.
221 584 F.2d at 383.
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land in its servient characteristics which result from the dominant property
characteristics of the navigable water by which it is submerged. If fast land is
to be subjected to public use for transportation, it must voluntarily be dedi-
cated to the public by the owner, or must be acquired by the public with due
compensation to the, owner. But land underlying navigable water underlies an
existing public roadway. By virtue of the water's presence it is burdened with a
public servitude. If the water body is interstate or forms part of an interstate
waterway the navigational servitude runs to the federal government. 2
This was so regardless of any applicable principles of Hawaii property
law:
Hawaii property law at most relates to any servitude the state may claim. If
the state chooses to relieve land underlying fishponds such as Kuapa Pond
from any navigational servitude otherwise owing to the state (even after the
pond's transformation into a marina), that is the state's business. The effect of
Hawaii law on state rights, however, is not before us. No matter what those
rights may be they can have no effect on the federal interest in interstate com-
merce nor the rights and obligations of the federal government in this respect
under the Constitution. When the waters of the pond became navigable wa-
ters of the United States, the federal navigational servitude attached.22 3
In December of 1979 the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit opinion in part, agreeing for the most part with the district
court.22 While concurring that the navigability of the pond-marina sub-
jected it to the regulatory authority of the corps, it held that the corps
had not thereby acquired a navigational servitude permitting free public
access.'" It did so by invoking the taking issue: At what point does a
regulation go so far as to amount to a taking for which just compensation
must be paid?
22 6
As to the matter of regulatory authority, the Court had no doubts at
all!
With respect to the Hawaii Kai Marina, for example, there is no doubt that
Congress may prescribe the rules of the road, define conditions under which
running lights shall be displayed, require the removal of obstructions to navi-
gation, and exercise its authority for such other reason as may seem to it in the
interests of furthering navigation or commerce2 1
But with respect to the navigational servitude, whether it could be as-
serted without payment of compensation for thus removing some sticks
22 Id. at 383-84.
223 Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
224 Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 48 U.S.L.W. 4045 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1979) (No. 78-738).
26 Id. at 4047-48.
:21 Id. at 4049-50; see BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
227 48 U.S.L.W. at 4048.
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from the bundle of property rights held by Kaiser-Aetna (Justice Rehn-
quist's words)22 8 was a question to be decided on the particular facts of
this case, rather than by reviewing "the shifting back and forth of the
Court in this area" which "bears the sound of 'Old, unhappy, far off
things, and battles long ago.' "229
First, the Court observed that Kuapa Pond was not navigable in fact
before improvement "30 (a factor the dissent regarded as irrelevant).2 31
Second, it noted that the pond "has always been considered to be private
property under Hawaiian law. Thus, the interest of petitioners in the now
dredged marina is strikingly similar to that of owners of fast land adja-
cent to navigable water."""2 Third, the Court observed that the corps had
specifically granted Kaiser-Aetna the right to dredge, which, said the
Court, it could have refused to do on the ground it would have impaired
navigation in the bay. 38 Therefore, reasoned the Court, (emphasizing
again the private property nature of the pond under Hawaiian law) the
corps' consent led to the fruition of an expectancy embodied in the con-
cept of property; namely, the right to exclude, which is so fundamental a
property right that the corps cannot take it by compelling Kaiser-Aetna
to open the marina to the general public without payment of
compensation. 23
4
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in this case may have
significance for Hawaii well beyond determining the limits of private
ownership of waters made navigable by improvements such as those made
by Kaiser-Aetna to Kuapa Pond. A more critical, though presumably
more parochial, issue is the extent to which federal courts will interfere in
local land use decisions which, while arguably raising federal questions,
are based on uniquely Hawaiian property concepts dating back to its in-
dependent days under a monarchy with feudal tenurial incidents.2 5
While carving out a special niche for Hawaii may be difficult, it is virtu-
ally the only way in which uniquely Hawaiian concepts which survive in
modern Hawaiian property law generally (and upon which many transac-
tions tend to be wholly or partially founded) will be preserved in the fed-
eral system of which Hawaii is a part. Just how important the staking out
of such a "uniquely Hawaiian" area in the law of real property can be is
328 Id.
'" Id. at 4049. The Court earlier in the opinion had made much of its inability in Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978), to come up with a "set
formula" in deciding takings cases.
330 48 U.S.L.W. at 4049.
Id. at n.9.
232 Id.
23 Id.
234 Id.
33 See J. CHINEN, THE GREAT MAHELE: HAWAII'S LAND DIVISION OF 1848 (1958); Water
Rights in Hawaii, supra note 207 at 141-75; T. CREIGHTON, THE LANDS OF HAWAII: THEIR
USE AND MISUSE chs. 1-4 (1978).
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even more starkly illustrated by the current litigation on the constitution-
ality of Hawaii's Land Reform Act" 6 and on shoreland ownership. The
latter is discussed briefly below.
B. Sotomura v. County of Hawaii: Who Owns the Seashore?
The question of who owns shorelands, and especially beach, is one
which increasingly confronts courts as clashes between private ownership
and public use become more frequent in this valuable and much sought
area."'7 Given the unique geography of Hawaii and the shoreland orienta-
tion of much of its resident and visitor population, it is no surprise to find
the conflict right here as well. Sotomura v. County of Hawaii" "s is the
latest in a series of cases in which the Hawaii Supreme Court has at-
tempted to assert public rights over private rights in the area of land
adjacent to water.23 9
The dispute in Sotomura arose over the payment of compensation to
the owners of beachfront property, which the County of Hawaii at-
tempted to condemn in 1970 for a public beach park.2 40 The lower court
separated the parcel into two parts for the purposes of valuation: that
part seaward of the line formed by debris from the highest wash of the
waves, for which it awarded $1.00; and that portion inland from the deb-
ris line, for which it awarded $1.20 per square foot or something in excess
of $200,000.2,1
The Hawaii Supreme Court not only affirmed this definition of the sea-
ward boundary, but also held (1) that the owners had lost title to part of
the land by erosion and (2) that the seaward boundary should be estab-
lished by the vegetation line, not the debris (or high water) line. 22 The
236 See Midkiff v. Tom, No. 79-0096 (D. Hawaii Dec. 19, 1979) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of aspects of the Land Reform Act, HAwmI REv. STAT. ch. 516 (1976 & Supp.
1979)).
'31 See, e.g., State v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); Note, Public Access to
Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REv. 564 (1970).
1" 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978).
'39 See, e.g., Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977), appeal docketed,
Civ. No. 78-2264 (9th Cir., filed Nov. 28, 1978); McBryde v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 504
P.2d 1330 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, cert denied and appeal dismissed sub noma.
McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). The critical specific issues raised by
these cases are discussed in detail in Water Rights in Hawaii, supra note 207, at 176-218.
The authors rightfully express grave doubts about the integrity of the state's judicial pro-
cess with respect to land use and real property if these cases were ultimately sustained. The
subject deserves far more extensive treatment in the periodical literature of the law than is
warranted in a land use survey to which these cases are but tangentially relevant. For an
analysis of the issues raised in the McBryde litigation see Chang, Unraveling Robinson v.
Ariyoshi: Can Courts "Take" Property?, 2 U. HAWAII L. REv. 57 (1979).
340 460 F. Supp. at 474.
241 Id. at 475-76.
112 County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Hawaii 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973), cert. denied, 419
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second holding withdrew 31,600 square feet of land between the debris
line and the vegetation line from that part of the property hitherto val-
ued at $1.20 per square foot (a total value of $37,920). This the federal
court reversed. The court first noted that the plaintiffs had neither
briefed nor argued the question of land ownership. The only issue before
the Hawaii Supreme Court on appeal, according to the federal district
court, was the manner of valuating the land for compensation. Therefore,
having failed to grant Sotomura a hearing before thus depriving him of
some 31,600 feet of property without compensation, the Hawaii Supreme
Court had denied him due process of law.
24 1
Procedural due process aside, however, the court held that there had
been a denial of substantive due process as well. 244 Entirely aside from
the registered boundaries of the tract,245 the district court could find no
precedent for the use of the vegetation line in determining the seaward
boundary of Sotomura's land, 4 and a good deal of precedent for the use
of the high water, or seaweed, or debris line for determining said bound-
ary.2 47 What particularly troubled the court was the use of what it consid-
ered inapposite Oregon precedent to bolster what the Hawaii Supreme
Court declared to be a longstanding public use of Hawaii's beaches to an
easily recognizable boundary that had ripened into a customary right. "
U.S. 872 (1974).
,3 460 F. Supp. at 477-78.
2" Id. at 478.
245 Id.
246 A single decision by the Hawaii Supreme Court, In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 440
P.2d 76 (1968), was noted by the district court but was restricted to the facts of record. The
court said:
The Hawaii Supreme Court's opinion in Sotomura does not indicate any legal basis for
the presumption that the upper reaches of the wash of the waves over the course of a
year lies along the line marking the edge of vegetation growth when such a line occurs
inland from a debris line marking the wash of the waves. The only basis for the pre-
sumption is the Court's statement that "the vegetation line is a more permanent monu-
ment, its growth limited by the year's highest wash of the waves." No evidence of a legal
or factual nature supporting the presumption was offered either in the State trial court
or in this Court.
460 F. Supp. at 480 (footnotes omitted).
147 460 F. Supp. at 478-79.
1i6 Id. at 480. The court continued at some length:
Evidence was introduced by the Owners in this Court to show that original grants of
title by the government were not limited to dry upland, above the highest wash of the
waves, but in some cases extended to low water mark, or to rocks in the sea constituting
the termini of lateral boundaries and, in at least one instance, included submerged reef
land. There was also expert testimony from a title abstractor with 50 years experience
that the monuments "sea," "seashore," "high water mark," "low water mark," "sea at
high tide," "sea at low tide," "sea at very low tide" or equivalent expressions in the
Hawaiian language were used to describe seaward boundaries, in both original title docu-
ments and subsequent conveyances. The same witness testified that monuments such as
"debris line," "edge of vegetation" and "highest wash of the waves" were not to be found
in these documents. No evidence or claim to the contrary has been offered or asserted in
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It said that no evidence was offered to show public use or customary
right. On the contrary, evidence offered actually belied the existence of
any customary right.2 49 The court concluded:
This Court fails to find any legal, historical, factual or other precedent or
basis for the conclusions of the Hawaii Supreme Court that, following erosion,
the monument by which the seaward boundary of seashore land in Hawaii is to
be fixed is the upper reaches of the wash of the waves. . . . The decision in
Sotomura was contrary to established practice, history and precedent and, ap-
parently, was intended to implement the court's conclusion that public policy
favors extension of public use and ownership of the shorelines. A desire to pro-
mote public policy, however, does not constitute justification for a state taking
private property without compensation. The Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution forbids it.220
V. CONCLUSION
While the Sotomura and Kaiser-Aetna cases are clearly on the way to
legal significance outside Hawaii, their major impact within the State will
be the extent to which uniquely Hawaiian land use issues will be decided
in uniquely Hawaiian fashion, unencumbered by mainland precedents, re-
gardless of the settling of the particular areas of law to which they relate.
Of considerably greater land use significance is the direction the Hawaii
Supreme Court will take in the area of vested rights after Life of the
Land and the implementation of land use plans after Dalton and its
progeny and the state plan. The planning process may control the devel-
opment process as never before in Hawaii - indeed, in the nation gener-
ally - and the system of reclassification pursuant to those plans in which
so-called development rights are reduced or destroyed will likely lead to
many a claim of vested rights. Liability for substantial sums must surely
affect the decisions of those charged with rezoning in accordance with
comprehensive plans. The City and County of Honolulu, at a minimum, is
enjoined by charter only to conform future rezonings to those plans, and
substantial damage awards to the private sector based on vested rights
claims cannot help but have a chilling effect on the speed with which such
rezonings occur. On the other hand, how long can such a body avoid the
presumably rational basis of its own plans? These issues bear considera-
tion as a newly constituted supreme court and newly authorized appellate
court consider the increasing number of legal challenges to state and local
land use decisions in the coming decade.
this case.
Id.
Id. at 479-80.
150 Id. at 480-81.
[Vol. 2
